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R U N N I N G  F R O M  T H E  G E N D E R  P O L I C E :
R E C O N C E P T U A L I Z I N G  G E N D E R  T O  E N S U R E
P R O T E C T I O N  F O R  N O N - B I N A R Y  P E O P L E
atie eineck*
ABSTRACT
Non-binary people who are discriminated against at work or school
are in a unique and demoralizing position. Not only have some
courts expressed reluctance to use existing antidiscrimination law to
protect plaintiffs who are discriminated against based on their gen-
der identity and not simply because they are men or women, in most
states non-binary genders are not legally recognized. I argue that a
fundamental right to self-identification grounded in the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment would provide non-binary
plaintiffs with the ability to assert their gender in court and have
that assertion carry legal weight, regardless of how friendly the Court
is to queer rights issues. I argue that a fundamental right to self-
identification would require courts to give the same wide degree of
deference to a plaintiff’s self-identification of their gender as they do
to a plaintiff’s self-identification of their religious beliefs. This legal
framework would prohibit courts from policing the gender of the
parties before them and allow them only to assess whether the plain-
tiff’s gender-related beliefs are sincerely held. Such a legal framework
would allow non-binary plaintiffs to bring claims under federal
anti-discrimination law without worrying that the Court will refuse
to recognize their gender as valid.
INTRODUCTION
In this Note, I examine the inadequacy of current antidiscrimination
law in protecting transgender people and the uncertainty in the level of
protection, if any, non-binary people can expect under our current legal
regime. I then propose a new framework for assessing gender, based on the
* J.D. 2017, University of Michigan Law School. I would like to thank Professor
Margo Schlanger for offering insight on this idea from its conception, Mary Bonauto
and Allison Wright for their valuable comments, Dana Zeigler, Saeeda Joseph-
Charles, Dana Leib, and Christine Crow for being my sounding board for months as
I wrote this piece, and the editorial staff of Michigan Journal of Gender & Law for all
their hard work and support.
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framework currently used for evaluation of religious discrimination claims,
that would ensure protection for transgender, including non-binary, people
under antidiscrimination law. Finally, I lay out the constitutional hook
needed to entitle gender self-identification to the same degree of deference
afforded to religious self-identification.
I will discuss binary transgender people—trans men and trans women,
gender non-conforming cisgender1 people, and non-binary people—who do
not identify within the accepted gender binary as men or women.2 Non-
binary people may identify with a specific label under the non-binary um-
brella, such as neutrois,3 bigender,4 genderfluid,5 androgyne,6 or agender,7
or with a more general label, such as genderqueer8 or non-binary. Non-
binary individuals may present in a way typically associated with women, by
wearing makeup, keeping their hair long, or wearing clothing sold in the
women’s section; in a way typically associated with men, by keeping their
hair short, growing facial hair, or wearing clothing sold in the men’s section;
or may present androgynously by mixing elements of the two. Some non-
binary people use she/her/hers or he/him/his pronouns, while others use
they/them/their pronouns or neo-pronouns.9 Some non-binary people expe-
rience body dysphoria, a physical or emotional discomfort with their body
and desire to change at least some sex characteristics, and may seek medical
intervention. Others do not.
In Part I, I review how binary transgender plaintiffs fare under antidis-
crimination law when they experience an adverse action in a realm where
the law requires gender-blindness. In Part II, I review how courts assess
1. Cisgender refers to those who identify with the gender they were assigned at birth.
Glossary of Terms, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, http://www.hrc.org/resources/glos-
sary-of-terms (last visited Nov. 10, 2017).
2. Kyle Smith & Meghan Schindler, Glossary, TRANS YOUTH EQUALITY FOUNDATION,
http://www.transyouthequality.org/glossary/ (last modified June 2015).
3. Neutrois is often understood as being associated with a neutral gender. Id.
4. Bigender individuals identify with two genders. They may identify with both simul-
taneously or shift between identifying with one or the other. See id.
5. Genderfluid individuals experience persistent changes in their gender. See id.
6. Androgyne individuals have a gender that is simultaneously masculine and feminine.
Id.
7. Agender individuals do not identify with gender as a concept. See id.
8. Genderqueer, like non-binary, is an umbrella term for individuals who identify
outside the gender binary. See id.
9. See Robin Marantz Henig, How Science is Helping Us Understand Gender, NAT’L
GEOGRAPHIC, (Jan. 2017), http://www.nationalgeographic.com/magazine/2017/01/
how-science-helps-us-understand-gender-identity/. Neo-pronouns include but are
not limited to xe/xem/xyr, ze/hir/hirs, and ey/em/eir. See Gender Pronouns, UNIV. OF
WIS., MILWAUKEE LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, TRANSGENDER RES. CTR., https://
uwm.edu/lgbtrc/support/gender-pronouns/ (last visited July 7, 2017).
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binary transgender plaintiffs’ claims in situations where the law does not
require gender-blindness, instead allowing different treatment based on gen-
der. In Part III, I argue that courts should apply a sincerely held belief
standard to plaintiffs’ self-identified gender and require accommodations to
be made for non-binary plaintiffs in situations where the law allows men
and women to be treated differently. In Part IV, I argue that individuals are
entitled to legal recognition of their self-identified gender under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
I. WHEN THE LAW IS GENDER-BLIND
Prior cases brought by binary transgender plaintiffs indicate that non-
binary employees may be able to successfully bring sex stereotyping claims.
This is especially true when courts have already recognized that the chal-
lenged action taken against the plaintiffs is prohibited if it is motivated by
gender.
In 2000, the Ninth Circuit held in Schwenk v. Hartford that the at-
tempted rape of a transgender inmate in a men’s prison by a corrections
officer violated the Gender Motivated Violence Act (“GMVA”)10 because it
was motivated by gender, after considering that the inmate exhibited “a
feminine rather than typically masculine appearance or demeanor”11 and
that the corrections officer’s demands for sex began only after he discovered
that “she considered herself female.”12 The court rejected earlier cases,
which held that conduct taken on the basis of transgender status was moti-
vated by gender, not by sex—by the plaintiff’s presentation and behavior,
not their anatomy—and therefore did not offend Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), which prohibits employment discrimina-
tion “based on sex.”13 The Ninth Circuit determined that the early Title VII
case law that distinguished sex from gender was implicitly overturned by
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, when the Supreme Court held that discrimina-
tion because of an employee’s failure to conform to traditional gender
norms is discrimination because of sex.14 The Ninth Circuit contended that
after Price Waterhouse, sex and gender are interchangeable under Title VII
and the federal antidiscrimination laws modeled after it.15
10. 34 U.S.C. § 12361 (Westlaw through P.L. 115-72).
11. Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1203 (9th Cir. 2000).
12. Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1202.
13. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (Westlaw through P.L. 115-72). The Gender Motivated Vio-
lence Act, 34 U.S.C. § 12361 (Westlaw through P.L. 115-82), like many federal
antidiscrimination laws, was modeled after Title VII and is interpreted based on
Title VII’s more extensive case law. Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1200–01.
14. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S 241, 250–51 (1989).
15. Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1202.
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In 2004, the Sixth Circuit heard an appeal out of Salem, Ohio after
the City of Salem began the process of terminating an employee at the fire
department, Jimmie Smith,16 when Smith disclosed that he had been diag-
nosed with Gender Identity Disorder17 and planned to transition from male
to female.18 The district court determined that the petitioner was fired not
because of his gender non-conformity, but because of his “transsexuality.”19
The Sixth Circuit disagreed. The court pointed out that the district court
had relied on case law from before Price Waterhouse and clarified that courts
should no longer understand sex discrimination under Title VII as applying
strictly to “the traditional concept of sex.”20 The court then accused other
courts, including itself in previous cases, of “legitimizing discrimination
based on the plaintiff’s gender non-conformity by formalizing the non-con-
formity into an ostensibly unprotected classification” based on the plaintiff’s
“mode of self-identification.”21 Finally, the Sixth Circuit held that the peti-
tioner’s transgender status did not preclude him from Title VII protection.22
For the purposes of his sex stereotyping theory, the petitioner’s transgender
status was irrelevant. What mattered was how his employer perceived him
and the actions that were taken based on that perception.23 The Eleventh
Circuit held similarly in 2011.24
In 2008, a Washington, D.C. district court decided a case brought by
a transgender woman, Diana Schroer, who had been offered a position with
the Library of Congress and had the job offer rescinded after she informed
Charlotte Preece, the employee tasked with filling the position, that she was
transgender and would be transitioning.25 Among its reasons for rescinding
16. Although the plaintiff was in the process of transitioning from male to female, he
referred to himself in the litigation materials by the name Jimmie, and he used he/
him/his pronouns. Complaint at 2, Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir.
2004).
17. Smith, 378 F.3d at 568. The DSM-IV characterizes Gender Identity Disorder as “a
strong and persistent cross-gender identification, which is the desire to be, or the
insistence that one is, of the other sex[,]” with a “persistent discomfort about one’s
assigned sex or a sense of inappropriateness in the gender role of that sex.” AMERI-
CAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS 532–33 (4th ed. 1994).
18. Smith, 378 F.3d at 567.
19. Smith, 378 F.3d at 571.
20. Smith, 378 F.3d at 572 (quoting Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085
(7th Cir. 1984)).
21. Smith, 378 F.3d at 574.
22. Smith, 378 F.3d at 574–75.
23. Smith, 378 F.3d at 574–75.
24. Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1317 (11th Cir. 2011) (“[D]iscrimination against
a transgender individual because of her gender-nonconformity is sex discrimination,
whether it’s described as being on the basis of sex or gender.”).
25. Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293 (D.D.C. 2008).
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the offer, the Library of Congress expressed concern over whether Schroer
would be able to maintain her military contacts, which had factored heavily
into their decision to hire her, after transitioning and whether members of
Congress would perceive her as credible, making it difficult for her to work
with their staff. The court determined that these two asserted reasons for
rescinding Schroer’s offer were facially discriminatory.26 The court acknowl-
edged that circuit courts have overwhelmingly held that discrimination on
the basis of gender identity is not prohibited under Title VII. Still, it found
that the Library of Congress had discriminated against Schroer under a sex
stereotyping theory.27 Specifically, the court noted that Preece’s perception
of Schroer “as especially masculine made it all the more difficult for her to
visualize Diana Schroer as anyone other than a man in a dress.”28 The court
also held that Schroer prevailed on the text of Title VII itself, determining
that even if the case law defining the word “sex” as a reference only to
anatomical or chromosomal characteristics survived Price Waterhouse, the
Library of Congress’ rescission of Schroer’s job offer “after being advised
that she planned to change her anatomical sex was literally discrimination
‘because of . . . sex.’”29 Schroer was the first federal antidiscrimination case
to recognize that discrimination against transgender workers because they
are transgender is sex discrimination within the meaning of Title VII.
In 2012, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(“EEOC”) publicly agreed with the D.C. district court through its decision
in Macy v. Holder.30 The EEOC outlined two theories a transgender em-
ployee could utilize to make out a prima facie case of sex discrimination for
conduct motivated by the employee’s transgender status. The EEOC ex-
plained that a transgender employee could show sex discrimination through
gender stereotyping by showing that they had suffered an adverse employ-
ment action because their employer believed “that biological men should
consistently present as men and wear male clothing”31 and vice versa for
employees assigned female at birth. Additionally, using the same burden-
shifting model used for traditional Title VII cases, a transgender employee
could prove sex discrimination without showing sex stereotyping if they
could prove that their employer was about to confer a benefit on them, such
as hiring or promotion, but then retracted it when they found out the
26. Schroer, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 302.
27. Schroer, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 305.
28. Schroer, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 305.
29. Schroer, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 308.
30. Macy v. Holder, Appeal No. 0120120821, 2012 WL 1435995, at *11–14
(E.E.O.C. Apr. 20, 2012).
31. Macy, 2012 WL 1435995, at *13.
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employee was transgender.32 For example, in Macy v. Holder, the plaintiff,
Mia Macy, was in the process of being hired by the Bureau of Alcohol,
Firearms, Tobacco, and Explosives (“ATF”) and had been informed that the
job was hers pending her successful completion of a background check.
However, after she informed ATF that she was transgender and would begin
transitioning, she was told that the position was no longer available.33 The
EEOC compared Macy’s sex discrimination claim to the religious discrimi-
nation claim of a Christian employee who is fired after their employer dis-
covers that the employee’s parents are Muslim, and therefore believes that
the employee should be Muslim.34 The EEOC reasoned that since an ad-
verse action taken because an employer believed their employee should be a
different religion indisputably constitutes religious discrimination, then the
adverse action ATF took against Macy because it believed she should be a
different sex constituted sex discrimination.35
In 2014, the Department of Education, Office for Civil Rights (“ED
OCR”) oversaw a resolution agreement between the parents of a transgender
middle school student and Downey Unified School District.36 The student’s
parents asserted that she had been harassed by other students based on her
transgender status and that her elementary school teachers had disciplined
her for exhibiting stereotypically feminine mannerisms and had insisted on
calling her by her birth name instead of the name she used post-transition.37
In its letter of findings, the ED OCR explained that a school may violate
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (“Title IX”)38 under a sex
stereotyping theory if a transgender student is being harassed by peers on
the basis of her transgender status and the school fails to respond appropri-
ately.39 The ED OCR said that “[a]ll students, including transgender stu-
dents and students who do not conform to sex stereotypes, are protected
from sex-based discrimination under Title IX.”40 Importantly, the letter of
findings concluding this investigation was released in October 2014, a year
and a half before the ED OCR implemented its now revoked guidelines—
32. Macy, 2012 WL 1435995, at *13.
33. Macy, 2012 WL 1435995, at *1–2.
34. Macy, 2012 WL 1435995, at *13.
35. Macy, 2012 WL 1435995, at *14.
36. Letter of Findings, Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Downey Unified
Sch. Dist., CA: OCR Case No. 09-12-1095 (Oct. 14, 2014).
37. Id. at 2–3.
38. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (Westlaw through P.L. 115-51).
39. Letter of Findings, supra note 36, at 1–2.
40. Id.
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which specified that Title IX entitled transgender students to treatment
based on their self-identified gender at school—in May 2016.41
These decisions demonstrate that a binary transgender person can suc-
cessfully bring a claim under Title VII and federal antidiscrimination laws
modeled after Title VII, as long as the complained-of conduct is impermis-
sible if motivated by gender, as is the case with attempted rape, unlawful
firing, and failure to correct harassment. While the friendliness of executive
agencies toward transgender claimants is now questionable, the EEOC and
ED OCR decisions lend support for transgender petitioners bringing sex
discrimination claims in court under Title VII and Title IX respectively.
The way these decisions were reached suggests that a non-binary
claimant could similarly make a sex discrimination claim based on conduct
already recognized as illegal under antidiscrimination law. None of these
decisions include invasive discussions about the personal lives or anatomy of
the claimants, where the court substitutes its understanding of the plaintiff’s
gender for the plaintiff’s understanding of their own gender, and all include
a successful sex stereotyping claim based on the sex that the respondent
believed the claimant to be. If it is impermissible for an employer to treat a
transgender woman employee adversely because the employer believes her to
be a man and because she does not conform to his idea of how a man
should behave, the employer has violated Title VII.42 It stands to reason that
a non-binary employee would also be able to make out a successful claim on
similar facts. Such an argument would not even require a court to determine
whether the employee’s self-identified gender is correct because the only
factor relevant to the claim is the respondent’s state of mind. The peti-
tioner’s actual gender is irrelevant to the claim. Because this theory of sex
discrimination against transgender individuals does not require the court to
actually recognize the plaintiff’s gender identity, it has found traction even
in circuits that have been otherwise conservative on queer issues.43
41. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Office for Civil Rights, & U.S. Dep’t of Just., Civil Rights
Division, Dear Colleague Letter on Transgender Students (May 13, 2016), https://
www.justice.gov/crt/page/file/942021/download.
42. Macy v. Holder, Appeal No. 0120120821, 2012 WL 1435995, at *13–14
(E.E.O.C. Apr. 20, 2012).
43. Compare Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d. 566 (6th Cir. 2004) (upholding a trans-
gender sex stereotyping claim), with DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 399–418 (6th
Cir. 2014), rev’d sub nom, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (holding
that bans on same-sex marriage do not violate the Equal Protection or Due Process
Clauses). The Sixth Circuit’s holding on same-sex marriage bans was preceded by the
Supreme Courts of Massachusetts, California, Connecticut, Iowa, and New Mexico
and district court orders that resulted in legalization in Oregon, Pennsylvania, North
Carolina, Wyoming, Arizona, Kansas, and Florida. See Megan Garvey et al., L.A.
TIMES, Gay Marriage Chronology, L.A. TIMES, June 6, 2015, http://graph-
ics.latimes.com/usmap-gay-marriage-chronology/. It was followed by South Carolina
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Additionally, in 2017, the Seventh Circuit decided Hively v. Ivy Tech
Community College of Indiana. In Hively, the Seventh Circuit determined
that discrimination against an employee because of the gender of her part-
ner was discrimination based on sex.44 The court made this determination
based on case law holding that adverse employment action taken against an
employee because of their association with a person of another race was
racial discrimination under Title VII.45 While this particular reason is diffi-
cult to apply to gender identity cases, the court also determined that
Hively’s termination because of her sexual orientation constituted an ad-
verse action based on an impermissible sex stereotype.46 This decision is
significant because it shows that courts are beginning to accept “sex,” under
Title VII, as a broad term that encompasses even the most fundamental
assumptions about men and women.
However, even in these apparently clear-cut situations, one court
struggled to make sense of a sex discrimination claim brought by an intersex
woman who was first passed over for a promotion and then fired after her
employer discovered she had undergone genital reconstructive surgery prior
to being hired.47 The Eastern District of Pennsylvania characterized the ad-
verse treatment Wilma Wood, an intersex employee, experienced, as dis-
crimination “on the basis of gender-corrective surgery” and held that it was
not sex discrimination covered under Title VII.48 In doing so, the court
cited the “plain meaning” of sex: “discrimination against women because of
their status as females and discrimination against males because of their sta-
tus as males.”49 The court also pointed to the legislature’s purpose in enact-
ing Title VII: “achieving equality between the sexes” but not “remedy[ing]
discrimination against individuals because they have undergone gender-cor-
rective surgery,”50 and to case law holding that discrimination against trans-
gender people was not sex discrimination.51 The court’s statements reflect a
lack of comprehension that some people exist outside the sex binary and
that discrimination against an intersex person because they are intersex is
literally discrimination “because of . . . sex.”52 It bears noting that Wood was
decided in 1987, two years before Price Waterhouse, which many courts ac-
and Montana later the same month, in addition to the Fourth, Seventh, Ninth, and
Tenth Circuits. Id.
44. Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017).
45. Hively, 853 F.3d at 347–49.
46. Hively, 853 F.3d at 346.
47. Wood v. C.G. Studios, Inc., 660 F. Supp. 176, 176 (E.D. Penn. 1987).
48. Wood, 660 F. Supp. at 177–78.
49. Wood, 660 F. Supp. at 177.
50. Wood, 660 F. Supp. at 177.
51. Wood, 660 F. Supp. at 178.
52. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (Westlaw through P.L. 115-46).
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knowledge as having invalidated the idea that sex discrimination under Title
VII covers only discrimination based on an outright animus toward either
women or men.53 It seems likely that this case would be decided differently
today.
Wood may nonetheless foreshadow how courts think of non-binary
gender. This is particularly important for non-binary plaintiffs who present
in a way typically associated with their sex assigned at birth. These individu-
als would likely need to make sex discrimination claims without relying on
sex stereotyping. In this situation, a successful case would depend on the
court being willing to interpret the antidiscrimination law in question as
reaching beyond binary genders and being willing to acknowledge non-bi-
nary genders as valid.
II. WHEN THE LAW ALLOWS FACIAL GENDER DISTINCTIONS
Under existing law, non-binary people face an uphill battle in trying
to bring claims in areas where sex classifications have thus far been recog-
nized as legal. When binary transgender plaintiffs bring discrimination cases
based on policies that are legally allowed to distinguish between genders,
they typically recognize the validity of the sex classification itself, but argue
that they are being classified as the wrong sex. Unlike recognizing that a
plaintiff was fired, harassed, or denied a promotion because of their sex or
perceived sex, these cases require courts to adjudicate the plaintiff’s gender
in order to determine whether discrimination has taken place. This opens
transgender plaintiffs up to invasive inquiries about their anatomy, medical
history, and personal life and often results in the court adjudicating the
plaintiff’s sex over their objections.
For example, in 2007, the Tenth Circuit heard an appeal out of Salt
Lake City. Krystal Etsitty was diagnosed with Gender Identity Disorder and
began hormone replacement therapy (“HRT”) almost four years before she
applied for a position with the Utah Transit Authority (“UTA”). At the
time, she was already presenting as a woman and using the name Krystal
outside work. Etsitty presented as a man at work and used men’s restrooms
during her training with the UTA but transitioned at work shortly after
being hired. Her transition included wearing makeup, jewelry, and acrylic
nails, and using the women’s restroom. Although her immediate supervisor
was initially supportive, Etsitty was eventually fired because the UTA was
concerned about liability for Etsitty using public women’s restrooms while
on her route and wearing a UTA uniform. Etsitty’s claim included two
53. E.g., Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 573 (6th Cir. 2004); Schwenk v. Hart-
ford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1201 (9th Cir. 2000).
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theories of sex discrimination under Title VII: gender identity as a protected
class and sex stereotyping.54 The Tenth Circuit cited several pre-Price
Waterhouse cases to reach its holding that “there is nothing in the record to
support the conclusion that the plain meaning of ‘sex’ encompasses any-
thing more than male and female.”55 The Tenth Circuit then dispensed with
Etsitty’s sex stereotyping claim by deciding that she had not presented a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether the UTA’s stated motivation,
avoiding liability, was pretextual.56 Here, the court was willing to accept the
UTA’s openly transphobic justification, Etsitty’s “intent to use women’s
public restrooms while wearing a UTA uniform, despite the fact that she
still had male genitalia,” as a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for her
termination.57
Similarly, in 2009, the Ninth Circuit determined that Rebecca Kastl’s
Title VII and Title IX sex discrimination claims could not survive summary
judgment. Kastl’s employer, Maricopa County Community College District
(“MCCCD”), banned her from using the women’s restrooms on campus
“until she could prove completion of sex reassignment surgery,” after receiv-
ing a complaint that “a man was using the women’s restrooms.”58 The dis-
trict later failed to renew her contract.59 While the Ninth Circuit
acknowledged that transgender people, like cisgender people, are protected
from discrimination based on sex stereotyping after Price Waterhouse and
Schwenk,60 it determined that Kastl had not presented sufficient evidence
that MCCCD’s proffered justification, “safety reasons,” was pretextual.61
Like the Tenth Circuit, the Ninth Circuit was willing to accept MCCCD’s
baseless and overtly transphobic assumption that Kastl would be a danger in
the women’s restroom as a legitimate and nondiscriminatory reason for the
disparate treatment she experienced, requiring Kastl to show that this reason
was pretextual in order to proceed to trial.
Finally, in 2015, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania decided Johnston v. University of Pittsburgh.62 The case was
brought by a transgender man, Seamus Johnston. He first told his parents
he was a boy when he was nine years old.63 When he applied to the Univer-
54. Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1221–24 (10th Cir. 2007).
55. Etsitty, 502 F.3d at 1221–22.
56. Etsitty, 502 F.3d at 1224.
57. 55Etsitty, 502 F.3d at 1224.
58. Kastl v. Maricopa Cty. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 325 F. App’x 492, 493 (9th Cir. 2009).
59. Kastl, 325 F. App’x at 493.
60. Kastl, 325 F. App’x at 493.
61. Kastl, 325 F. App’x at 494.
62. Johnston v. Univ. of Pittsburg of Commonwealth Sys. of Higher Educ., 97 F. Supp.
3d 657 (W.D. Pa. 2015).
63. Johnston, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 662.
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sity of Pittsburgh at Johnstown (“UPJ”) in March 2009, he listed his gender
on his application materials as “female.” However, in May 2009 he started
presenting as a man and holding himself out as a man in all aspects of life.64
In 2010, he received a diagnosis of Gender Identity Disorder from a psycho-
therapist and legally changed his name.65 In 2011, he registered with the
selective service, began HRT, amended the gender marker on his driver’s
license, and requested that UPJ change his name and gender on his school
records.66 He amended the gender markers on his passport and social secur-
ity record in February 2012 and November 2013, respectively.67 He used
the men’s restrooms on campus the entire time he was a student at UPJ.68
Johnston enrolled in a men’s weight training class and began using the
men’s locker room before and after class in Spring 2011. He did so all
semester without incident. He reenrolled in the class in Fall 2011 and used
the men’s locker room before and after class, as he had done before.69 How-
ever, in September 2011, school officials informed him that he was required
to use a referee locker room unless his gender was updated with the univer-
sity, for which he needed a court order or an amended birth certificate.70 He
continued to use the men’s locker room throughout the semester without
incident until late November, when the university began to discipline him.
The university responded by barring him from male-designated facilities on
campus until his graduation and by eventually expelling him and filing
criminal charges against him.71 The court found that Johnston had not
stated a cognizable claim of discrimination under the Equal Protection
Clause.72 In doing so, the court defined the university’s interest in banning
Johnston from men’s facilities as “providing its students with a safe and
comfortable environment for performing [some of life’s most basic and rou-
tine] functions consistent with society’s long-held tradition of performing
such functions in sex-segregated spaces based on biological or birth sex.”73
Here, the court accepted the very behavior that Johnston was challenging as
discriminatory as a legitimate government interest without considering
whether that behavior was actually discriminatory. The court later stated
that “while Plaintiff might identify his gender as male, his birth sex is fe-
64. See Johnston, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 662.
65. Johnston, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 662.
66. Johnston, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 662–63.
67. Johnston, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 662.
68. See Johnston v. Univ. of Pittsburg of Commonwealth Sys. of Higher Educ., 97 F.
Supp. 3d 657, 663 (W.D. Pa. 2015).
69. Johnston, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 663.
70. See Johnston, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 663.
71. See Johnston, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 663–64.
72. See Johnston, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 670.
73. Johnston, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 668.
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male. It is this fact—that plaintiff was born a biological female, as alleged in
the complaint—that is fatal to Plaintiff’s sex discrimination claim.”74 The
parties later settled out of court.75
The flimsy justifications courts are willing to accept as legitimate and
nondiscriminatory when a transgender plaintiff is trying to access a gender-
affirming sex-segregated space are in stark contrast to the justifications re-
quired by courts while assessing other types of discrimination cases. Courts
have long recognized that employers may not point to customer preference
to excuse discrimination. The Fifth Circuit first rejected this rationalization
in 1971, when Pan Am tried to argue that sex was a bona fide occupational
qualification (“BFOQ”) for being a flight attendant because passengers pre-
ferred women flight attendants to men.76 The court pointed out that the
customer preferences and prejudices Pan Am pointed to as its justification
were the exact ills the Civil Rights Act was meant to overcome.77 In later
years, other circuits also held that customer preference cannot justify dis-
crimination.78 Notably, the Ninth Circuit refused to recognize a BFOQ for
a position at an oil company that required dealings with nations that might
refuse to do business with women.79
These holdings are in accordance with the “heckler’s veto” doctrine in
First Amendment law, which states that the government cannot shut down
speech on the basis that it is so unpopular it might cause the audience to
react violently toward the speaker. Our civil rights law, across subjects, is
premised on the idea that discrimination cannot be validated based on the
reactions of third parties. In contrast, when a transgender plaintiff files a sex
discrimination claim, courts are willing to accept as a justification that the
transgender employee’s presence in the restroom might make other employ-
74. Johnston v. Univ. of Pittsburg of Commonwealth Sys. of Higher Educ., 97 F. Supp.
3d 657, 671 (W.D. Pa. 2015) (emphasis in original).
75. Lauren Rosenblatt & Emily Brindley, Pitt Settles Johnston Lawsuit, Looks to Form
Trans Inclusion Group, PITT NEWS, Mar. 30, 2016, http://pittnews.com/article/
70006/news/pitt-settles-johnston-lawsuit-looks-to-form-trans-inclusion-group/.
76. See Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 381, 387–88 (5th Cir. 1971).
77. See Diaz, 442 F.2d at 389.
78. See Chaney v. Plainfield Healthcare Ctr., 612 F.3d 908 (7th Cir. 2010) (holding
that a policy of assigning nurses according to residents’ racial preferences was hostile
and abusive, and violated Title VII); Ferrill v. Parker Group, Inc., 168 F.3d 468
(11th Cir. 1999) (holding that race-matching callers to customers when requested by
customers during get-out-the-vote drives violated Title VII); Bradley v. Pizzaco of
Neb., Inc., 7 F.3d 795 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that a customer preference for pizza
delivery workers without beards could not justify a no beard policy that had a dispa-
rate impact on black men); Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir.
1981) (holding that a position requiring dealings with nations that may refuse to do
business with women could not justify a male gender BFOQ).
79. Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d, 1273, 1276–77 (9th Cir. 1981).
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ees, students, or in Krystal Etsitty’s case, other residents of the city, uncom-
fortable. Defendants are likewise permitted to win based on justifications
that, themselves, rest on transphobic assumptions, such as MCCCD’s as-
sumption that Rebecca Kastl’s presence in the women’s restroom at the
school where she taught was inherently dangerous.
Prior to the legalization of same-sex marriage, many states also insisted
on considering transgender individuals their sex assigned at birth for the
purpose of forbidding them to marry, regardless of their surgical status or
documentation to the contrary. In 1999, the Court of Appeals of Texas
declared a marriage between a cisgender man and a post-operative trans-
gender woman, Christie Littleton, invalid on the basis that it was a same-sex
marriage, disregarding Littleton’s amended birth certificate as inaccurate
and nonbinding.80 In the opinion, the court went into detail about Lit-
tleton’s transition, including what genitalia she was born with and currently
had,81 listed the internal reproductive organs she did not have,82 and in-
formed readers that she was named after her father at birth.83 The court also
repeatedly referred to Littleton as a “transsexual male” who “look[s] like a
woman.”84
Likewise, the Supreme Court of Kansas determined that a marriage
between a deceased cisgender man and a transgender woman, whom the
court only identified by the name J’Noel, was void because it did not fit the
“opposite sex” requirement in Kansas law.85 Again, the Court described in
detail the procedures that J’Noel had undergone during her transition,86 the
internal reproductive organs and capabilities she lacked,87 and her sexual
activities with her deceased husband.88 In 2003, the Ohio Court of Appeals
considered the same issue when a transgender man, Jacob Nash, attempting
to marry a cisgender woman brought suit after the couple was denied a
marriage license.89 Like the Texas court, the Ohio court intimated that
Nash’s original birth certificate was correct, and that recognizing his
amended birth certificate, which accurately reflected his gender, would be
adverse to public policy.90 Again, the court defined Nash’s sex based on the
80. Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 231 (Tex. App. 1999).
81. See Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 224.
82. Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 230.
83. Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 224.
84. Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 230.
85. See In re Estate of Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120, 135–37 (Kan. 2002).
86. See In re Estate of Gardiner, 42 P.3d at 122–23.
87. See In re Estate of Gardiner, 42 P.3d at 135.
88. See In re Estate of Gardiner, 42 P.3d at 122.
89. See In re Marriage License for Nash, Nos. 2002-T-0149, 2002-T-0179, 2003 WL
23097095, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 31, 2003).
90. See In re Marriage License for Nash, 2003 WL 23097095 at *6.
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reproductive functions he was not able to complete and determined that to
issue him a marriage license would be “directly contrary to the state’s posi-
tion against same-sex and common law marriages.”91
Courts have also been reluctant to protect gender non-conforming cis-
gender people in situations where differentiation on the basis of sex is legal.
In Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., decided in 2006, the Ninth Circuit
evaluated a gender-specific dress code that required women to wear
makeup.92 The case was brought by an employee, Darlene Jespersen, who
asserted that wearing makeup conflicted with her self-image and that she
felt so uncomfortable wearing makeup that it interfered with her ability to
work.93 Jespersen claimed that the makeup requirement violated Title VII’s
prohibition on sex discrimination because it “subjected [women] to terms of
employment to which men were not similarly subjected” and because it
“require[ed] women to conform to sex stereotypes as a term and condition
of employment.”94 The Ninth Circuit disagreed. The court pointed to a
long history of allowing employers to treat men and women differently with
regard to dress codes, both in its own and other circuits, and upheld the
dress code because Jespersen had not presented evidence that the dress code
imposed an unequal burden on men versus women.95 The court similarly
rejected Jespersen’s sex stereotyping theory because it found no evidence
that Harrah’s had adopted the policy with the intention of forcing women
employees to conform to sex-based stereotypes, citing the parts of the policy
that were unisex.96 Here, the court failed to recognize that stereotyping can
be based on implicit biases97 and does not require the employer to realize
that it is asking women employees to adhere to a gendered stereotype when
91. See In re Marriage License for Nash, 2003 WL 23097095 at *6 (quoting In re Bick-
nell, 771 N.E.2d 846, 849 (Ohio 2002) (Stratton, J., dissenting)).
92. Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
93. Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1107–08.
94. Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1108.
95. Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1110 (citing Fountain v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 555 F.2d 753,
755 (9th Cir. 1977); Barker v. Taft Broad. Co., 549 F.2d 400, 401 (6th Cir. 1977);
Earwood v. Cont’l Se. Lines, Inc., 539 F.2d 1349, 1350 (4th Cir. 1976); Longo v.
Carlisle DeCoppet & Co., 537 F.2d 685, 685 (2d Cir. 1976) (per curiam); Knott v.
Mo. P.R. Co., 527 F.2d 1249, 1252 (8th Cir. 1975); Willingham v. Macon Tel.
Publ’g Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1092 (5th Cir. 1975) (en banc); Baker v. Cal. Land
Title Co., 507 F.2d 895, 896 (9th Cir. 1974); Dodge v. Giant Food, Inc., 488 F.2d
1333, 1337 (D.C. Cir. 1973)).
96. Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1112.
97. Implicit biases are unconscious assumptions about groups of people that can become
“embedded in the organizational structures, authority lines, job classifications, insti-
tutional rules, and administrative procedures of employment firms.” Cecilia Ridge-
way & Shelley J. Correll, Unpacking the Gender System: A Theoretical Perspective on
Gender Beliefs and Social Relations, 18 GENDER & SOC’Y 510, 524 (2004).
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it determines, for example, that they must wear makeup to look
professional.
Some recent decisions have been friendly to transgender and gender
non-conforming individuals. In 2016, the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Ohio granted a preliminary injunction requiring a
transgender student’s school district to allow her to use the girls’ restroom
on the basis that her Title IX and Equal Protection claims were substantially
likely to succeed on the merits.98 In that case, Jane Doe, an eleven-year-old
in Highland Local School District, intervened in a case brought by the
DOE. The Court’s assessment of the plaintiff’s Title IX claim was based in
part on the DOE’s now defunct guidance99 and in part on case law that
predates the guidance, such as Smith, Schwenk, and Price Waterhouse,100 so it
is unclear how the revocation of the DOE’s guidance affects this holding.
However, the Court determined gender identity was a quasi-suspect class
entitled to intermediate scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. The
court based its determination on the history of discrimination against trans-
gender people, the irrelevance of one’s gender identity to their ability to
contribute to society, and the fact that “transgender people have . . . immu-
table [and] distinguishing characteristics that define them as a discrete
group.”101 The court held that the policy was not substantially related to the
school district’s interest in preserving its students’ dignity and privacy. The
court based this determination on amici curiae from other grade schools
that had adopted trans-inclusive policies and had experienced no disruption
or complaints about specific violations of privacy.102 The court similarly
rejected the district’s stated interest in safety, noting that “no incidents of
individuals using an inclusive policy to gain access to sex-segregated facilities
for an improper purpose have ever occurred.”103 The court also expressly
declined to consider Johnston persuasive, citing its reliance on pre-Price
Waterhouse case law and rejection of Smith.104 The Sixth Circuit declined to
stay the preliminary injunction. The court stated that the school district had
98. Bd. of Educ. of Highland Local Sch. Dist. v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 208 F. Supp. 3d
850, 870–71, 887 (S.D. Ohio 2016), aff’d, Dodds v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 845 F.3d
217 (6th Cir. 2016).
99. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., supra note 41.
100. Bd. of Educ. of Highland Local Sch. Dist., 208 F. Supp. 3d at 868–70.
101. Bd. of Educ. of Highland Local Sch. Dist., 208 F. Supp. 3d at 873 (quoting Lyng v.
Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986)).
102. Bd. of Educ. of Highland Local Sch. Dist., 208 F. Supp. 3d at 874–76.
103. Bd. of Educ. of Highland Local Sch. Dist., 208 F. Supp. 3d at 876 (emphasis in
original).
104. Bd. of Educ. of Highland Local Sch. Dist. v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 208 F. Supp. 3d
850, 870–71, 875 (S.D. Ohio 2016).
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not shown a likelihood of success on the merits or irreparable harm and that
staying the injunction was not in the public interest.105
In a similar case, decided after the DOE’s guidance was revoked, the
Seventh Circuit upheld a preliminary injunction restricting a high school
from enforcing an unwritten policy prohibiting transgender students from
using gender-affirming restrooms unless they had completed a full medical
transition.106 The court noted that the required procedure was prohibited
for individuals under eighteen years old and acknowledged that not all
transgender individuals wish to undergo a complete surgical transition.107
The Court stated that a policy prohibiting transgender students from using
restrooms in accordance with their self-identified gender punished them for
their gender non-conformity and violated Title IX.108 The court also con-
sidered the increased stigmatization the plaintiff, a transgender student, ex-
perienced when the school required him to use a gender-neutral restroom
that no one else used.109 It bears noting that the court placed some weight
on both the student’s medical diagnosis of Gender Dysphoria and the fact
that he was living in accordance with this gender identity.110 It is unclear
whether a student without a medical diagnosis would have obtained the
same outcome.
In an aforementioned case, the ED OCR brokered a resolution agree-
ment between Downey Unified Public School District and the parents of a
transgender middle school student who filed the complaint which ensured
that the district would “treat the Student as a girl in all respects,” including
allowing her to use the girls’ restroom at school.111 Likewise, the ED OCR
entered into a resolution agreement with Arcadia Unified School District
after its investigation revealed that, despite the fact that the transgender
student who filed the complaint was well-accepted among his peers, he was
not permitted to use the boys’ restroom or locker room at school.112 He had
also been required to stay by himself in a cabin with a parent on a school
trip, although several other students had requested him as a cabin mate and
the camp had informed the district of alternative accommodations that
105. Dodds v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 845 F.3d 217, 221-22 (6th Cir. 2016), aff’g Bd. of
Educ. of Highland Local Sch. Dist., 208 F. Supp. 3d at 876.
106. Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ., 858 F.3d 1034 (7th
Cir. 2017).
107. Whitaker, 858 F.3d at 1041.
108. Whitaker, 858 F.3d at 1049.
109. Whitaker, 858 F.3d at 1050.
110. Whitaker, 858 F.3d at 1050.
111. Letter of Findings, supra note 36, at 4.
112. Letter of Findings, Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Arcadia Unified Sch.
Dist., CA: OCR Case No. 09-12-1020 (July 24, 2013) at 3–4.
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would allow the student to share a cabin with other boys.113 The resolution
agreement instructed the school to allow the student access to all boys’ facil-
ities and treat the student as a boy in every respect.114
The Fourth Circuit ruled favorably in the case of a transgender plain-
tiff alleging discrimination in a situation where gender classifications are
legal. In G.G. v. Gloucester County School Board, the Fourth Circuit upheld
ED OCR guidance instructing schools to allow transgender students to use
the restrooms that match their gender identity under the rationale that such
an interpretation of Title IX was not arbitrary or capricious.115 This decision
has been vacated as moot due to the recension of the guidance at issue.
However, the opinion is still telling because it rests on the Fourth Circuit’s
acceptance that the text of Title IX is ambiguous with respect to transgender
students’ access to gender-affirming restrooms.116 The Court determined
that, although the law is clear that schools are able to provide separate girls’
and boys’ restrooms, it is silent on what defines a girl or a boy for the
purposes of restroom usage.117 The decision is significant because it repre-
sents a break from earlier case law, where courts tended to interpret Title IX
as unambiguously not protecting transgender students’ access to gender-af-
firming restrooms.118
Non-binary plaintiffs specifically have also seen some success in recent
months in the arena of gender markers on identifying documents. In June
2016, Jamie Shupe became the first American to have their legal sex
changed to non-binary after a district court in Oregon found that Shupe
had completed the requirements to qualify for a legal sex change and that
no person had shown cause for why their request should not be granted.119
Kelly Keenan, an intersex individual from California, became the second
legally recognized non-binary person in September of the same year.120 In
November 2016, Dana Zzyym successfully sued the State Department in
federal district court in Colorado to have their gender marker on their
113. Id. at 3–6.
114. Resolution Agreement, Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Arcadia Unified
Sch. Dist., CA: OCR Case No. 09-12-1020 (July 24, 2013) at 3.
115. G.G. ex rel Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 723 (4th Cir. 2016),
vacated as moot and remanded, 137 S. Ct. 1239 (2017).
116. Id. at 720–21.
117. Id. at 720.
118. The court distinguished this case from Johnston by noting that the Johnston court did
not consider the DOE’s guidance and, therefore, did not grapple with the adminis-
trative law concerns posed by G.G. G.G. ex rel Grimm, 822 F.3d at 723 n.9.
119. In re Sex Change of Jamie Shupe, Or. Cir. Ct. Cty. Multnomah, No. 16CV13991, 1
(June 10, 2016).
120. Decree Changing Name and Gender, Santa Cruz Cty. Sup. Ct., No. 16CV02024, 1
(Sept. 25, 2016).
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passport changed to X.121 In support of their petition, Zzyym submitted
documents from the Veterans Affairs Medical Center in Cheyenne, Wyo-
ming that noted that their sex was “intersex.”122 The court determined that
the State Department’s binary-only gender marker policy was not the result
of a rational decision-making process, and therefore, did not satisfy the “ar-
bitrary or capricious” standard for reviewing agency action.123 The State
Department argued that it could not register an individual’s gender as X
because the documentation required as proof of gender only allowed for F
and M gender designations.124 However, the court noted that the State De-
partment accepted third party affidavits attesting to gender as proof of gen-
der, as long as they suggested a binary gender.125 The court similarly
rejected the State Department’s arguments that passport information
needed to be able to be recorded in databases that only accepted M and F
gender designations and that a passport with a non-binary gender marker
might cause confusion when used in countries that only acknowledge two
genders.126 Finally, in March 2017, the same Oregon district court that
granted Jamie Shupe’s petition allowed a Portland resident named Patch to
receive a legal designation of agender, making Patch the first known legally
genderless American.127
As legal recognition of non-binary genders grows, it is uncertain what
requirements might be put into place for individuals hoping to change their
legal gender. Jamie Shupe, for example, was required to show that they had
undergone “surgical, hormonal, or other treatment appropriate for this per-
son for the purpose of gender transition” and that “sexual reassignment
ha[d] been completed” in order to have their legal sex changed in Ore-
gon.128 The statute does not define the terms “treatment” or “sexual reas-
signment.” This wording suggests that, while surgical or hormonal
treatment are not necessary, some form of medical or psychological care is
required. The cost of either could be prohibitive to low-income people. This
requirement also implies that the Oregon legislature understands body
121. Zzyym v. Kerry, 220 F. Supp. 3d 1106, 1108 (D. Colo. 2016).
122. Zzyym, 220 F. Supp. 3d at 1109.
123. Zzyym, 220 F. Supp. 3d at 1111–14.
124. Zzyym, 220 F. Supp. 3d at 1113.
125. Zzyym, 220 F. Supp. 3d at 1113.
126. Zzyym, 220 F. Supp. 3d at 1113–14.
127. See Mary Emily O’Hara, Judge Grants Oregon Resident the Right to be Genderless,
NBC NEWS, Mar. 23, 2017, http://www.nbcnews.com/feature/nbc-out/judge-
grants-oregon-resident-right-be-genderless-n736971. Patch, who does not use pro-
nouns, was also granted the right to become mononymous, meaning that Patch has
only one name instead of a first and last name. Id.
128. In re Sex Change of Jamie Shupe, Or. Cir. Ct. Cty. Multnomah, No. 16CV13991, 1
(June 10, 2016); OR. REV. STAT. § 33.460 (Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.).
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dysphoria to be a necessary aspect of trans-ness. This misconception is likely
to disproportionately impact non-binary individuals.
III. A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING SEX DISCRIMINATION
Because existing law is inadequate in its ability to address the discrimi-
nation that non-binary people face, I propose a new framework for assessing
sex discrimination as a whole. In this Section, I argue that the framework
best suited to sex discrimination claims, and especially cases brought by
transgender people, is the one already applied to religious discrimination. I
will refer to this framework as the self-identification framework because it
would give transgender individuals the agency to define their own gender as
they experience it.
A. The Self-Identification Framework as Applied to Religion
The First Circuit has outlined the elements of a religious discrimina-
tion case.129 To make out a prima facie case based on failure to accommo-
date, an employee must establish that a “bona fide religious practice”
conflicted with an employer’s policy, and this conflict was the reason for the
adverse employment action.130 A bona fide religious practice is a religious
practice based on a sincerely held belief that is religious in nature. The bur-
den then shifts to the employer to show that they either offered a reasonable
accommodation allowing the employee to practice their religious beliefs or
that any accommodation would have been an undue hardship for the em-
ployer.131 When the claim is simply based on religious discrimination, and
not a failure to accommodate, the court’s assessment is identical to its as-
sessment of gender discrimination claims, with the caveat that the court is
not allowed to adjudicate the plaintiff’s religion beyond whether it is a sin-
cerely held belief.
1. The Sincerely Held Belief Standard
The standard under which courts assess a plaintiff’s religious belief,
including whether they are entitled to an accommodation, is whether the
129. Sa´nchez-Rodrı´guez v. AT&T Mobility P.R., Inc., 673 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2012).
130. Sa´nchez-Rodrı´guez, 673 F.3d at 8. The First Circuit also listed as a requirement that
the employee inform the employer of her need for an accommodation. After the
Supreme Court’s decision in E.E.O.C. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, the employer
need only suspect that the employee needs an accommodation. EEOC v. Abercrom-
bie & Fitch Stores, 135 S. Ct. 2028, 2028 (2015).
131. Sa´nchez-Rodrı´guez, 673 F.3d at 8.
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plaintiff’s asserted belief is sincerely held and religious in nature.132 Pursuant
to the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment of the Constitution, the
Court may not evaluate the validity or truthfulness of the plaintiff’s relig-
ious beliefs.133 The Court acknowledges that “[r]eligious experiences which
are as real as life to some may be incomprehensible to others”134 and that
“religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensi-
ble to others.”135 Courts are likewise not permitted to assess how central or
indispensable a practice is to a plaintiff’s religious beliefs or whether other
members of the plaintiff’s professed religion subscribe to the practice.136
The Court recognizes that “holding that some sincerely held religious beliefs
and practices are not ‘central’ to certain religions, despite protestations to
the contrary from the religious objectors who brought the lawsuit . . . would
require us to rule that some religious adherents misunderstood their own
religious beliefs.”137 It further acknowledged that any consideration of these
ideas would essentially require courts to play religion police, a role in which
courts were never intended to be cast and that would offend the First
Amendment.138
In assessing the sincerity of a religious belief, courts have considered
factors such as whether the plaintiff has told anyone they subscribe to the
belief or practice for a religious reason, whether they have been persistent in
their need to exercise the belief or practice,139 whether there is documenta-
tion of the plaintiff’s asserted religion, whether the plaintiff engages in any
other practices consistent with the asserted religion, and whether others can
132. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185 (1965).
133. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 184–85 (quoting United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86
(1944)).
134. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 184.
135. Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981).
136. See Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 457–58 (1988)
(declining to assess the centrality of certain lands to the religious practices of the
Yurok, Karok, and Tolowa Tribes); see also Clay v. United States, 403 U.S. 698,
702–03 (1971) (stating that the plaintiff’s beliefs were founded on the tenants of
Islam “as he understands them” and therefore fell within the religious training and
belief provision of the draft exemption).
137. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 457–58. However, in some non-employment settings where an
individual’s rights are restricted, such as prisons, some circuits require plaintiffs to
show that the practice is doctrinally required. Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1220
(10th Cir. 2007).
138. See Lyng, 485 U.S. at 457–58.
139. Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1220 (10th Cir. 2007) (noting that an inmate had
repeatedly asked prison officials for a set of tarot cards in order to practice his
religion).
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attest to the plaintiff’s religious beliefs.140 However, despite the fact that
third party affidavits may be used as evidence in support of the plaintiff’s
sincerity, they may not be used to show that the plaintiff’s belief that they
belong to a certain religion is inaccurate.141 In practice, the sincerely held
belief standard is a low bar and, ultimately, determining whether the plain-
tiff’s religious beliefs are sincerely held comes down to a credibility assess-
ment of the plaintiff.142
2. The Religious in Nature Standard
To be entitled to accommodations, the employee must subscribe to a
belief or practice that is religious in nature, not based on personal philo-
sophical, or moral ideals.143 This bar is also low and deferential to the plain-
tiff’s assertion. The plaintiff must be able to describe the scope of the belief
but may not be penalized for not being as articulate as the Court might
like.144 The Court may not hold against the plaintiff that the plaintiff is not
a member of an established religious sect;145 that the plaintiff’s beliefs are
not an outlined tenet of the religion to which the plaintiff belongs;146 that
the particular practice at issue is uncommon among members of the plain-
tiff’s religion;147 that other members of the plaintiff’s religion, including
religious authorities, do not consider the plaintiff to be a member of the
religion;148 or that the plaintiff is struggling with their beliefs.149 The only
140. See Jackson v. Mann, 196 F.3d 316, 320 (2nd Cir. 1999) (noting that an inmate had
listed his religious preference as Jewish on prison documentation and that he partici-
pated in the kosher meal program).
141. See Jackson, 196 F.3d at 320 (determining that the district court had erroneously
substituted accuracy for sincerity in relying on a rabbi’s testimony that the plaintiff
was not, in fact, Jewish because he was not born Jewish and had not formally
converted).
142. Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 124 F.3d 1349, 1352 (10th Cir. 1997).
143. See Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 713–14 (1981).
144. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 715. Thomas terminated his employment when he was trans-
ferred to a department where he would be producing turrets for tanks. He stated that
he “really could not . . . continue to work with armaments. It would be against all of
the . . . religious principles that . . . I have come to learn.” Id. at 714 (quoting
Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 391 N.E.2d 1127, 1133 (Ind.
1979)). However, he also stated that he would not object to “produc[ing] the raw
product necessary for the production of any kind of tank” because he “would not be
. . . chargeable in . . . conscience.” Id. at 715 (quoting Review Bd., 391 N.E.2d at
1131-31).
145. Frazee v. Ill. Dep’t of Emp’t Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 834–35 (1989).
146. Frazee v. Ill. Dep’t of Emp’t Sec., 489 U.S. at 834–35.
147. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 715–16.
148. Jackson v. Mann, 196 F.3d 316, 320–21 (2nd Cir. 1999).
149. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 715.
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requirement is that the plaintiff believes the policy for which they are seek-
ing an accommodation is prohibited by their religion as written.150
3. The Duty to Accommodate
Title VII defines religious discrimination in employment to include
failure to accommodate, to the extent reasonable, an employee’s religious
observance or practice, as long as doing so is not an undue hardship on the
employer.151 In assessing the reasonableness of an accommodation, the court
considers the totality of the circumstances, including any combination of
accommodations offered by the employer.152 Notably, while Title VII re-
quires employers to make reasonable accommodations for religious employ-
ees, it does not require employers to make the employee’s most preferred
accommodation.153 The inquiry ends once the court determines that the
accommodation offered is reasonable.154 The court does not consider
whether the employer could have provided the accommodation preferred by
the employee at the same cost if the employee finds the accommodation
offered by the employer to be adequate.155
An undue hardship is defined as “requir[ing the employer] to bear
more than a de minimis cost,”156 which “entails not only monetary con-
cerns, but also the employer’s burden in conducting its business.”157 The
Supreme Court has suggested that this includes favoring some employees
over others in allocating a coveted limited resource, especially when it would
otherwise be allocated based on a neutral system.158 An accommodation can
also be an undue hardship when it would require the employer to hire extra
work or undergo a loss in production.159 However, courts have repeatedly
150. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 716.
151. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (Westlaw through P.L. 102-166).
152. E.g., Sturgill v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 512 F.3d 1024, 1030 (8th Cir. 2008).
153. Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 68 (1986).
154. Philbrook, 479 U.S. at 68.
155. See Philbrook, 479 U.S. at 68 (refusing to consider an employee’s offer to pay all
costs associated with one of his preferred accommodations).
156. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977).
157. Beadle v. City of Tampa, 42 F.3d 633, 636 (11th Cir. 1995) (citing Hardison, 432
U.S. at 84).
158. Hardison, 432 U.S. at 84 (holding that an accommodation giving an employee Sat-
urdays off for religious observance would impose an undue hardship because it
would violate the system for allocating days off based on seniority).
159. E.g., Brown v. Polk Cty., 61 F.3d 650, 655 (8th Cir. 1995) (finding that an em-
ployer rightfully fired an employee who directed a secretary to type up his Bible
study notes “since the work that that employee would otherwise be doing would
have to be postponed, done by another employee, or not done at all”); Lee v. ABF
Freight Sys., Inc., 22 F.3d 1019, 1023 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding that accommodat-
ing an employee’s Sabbath observation would impose undue hardship on an em-
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held that employers cannot save a discriminatory policy by arguing that
customers might prefer someone else over the plaintiff.160
As the Supreme Court held in EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch, actual
knowledge of the employee’s need for an accommodation is not required for
an adverse employment action to be deemed discriminatory.161 In this case,
the Court considered a complaint filed by the EEOC on behalf of a Muslim
teenager, Samantha Elauf, whose job application Abercrombie rejected.162
This rejection was premised on a manager’s belief that the Elauf’s headscarf
would violate the company’s no-headwear policy,163 despite the fact that
Elauf had not told the manager that her headscarf was a religious garment
and that she would need a religious accommodation to wear it at work.164
Therefore, the company argued that, because it had no actual knowledge of
Elauf’s need for a religious accommodation, it was not subject to Title VII
liability.165 The Court determined that an employer need not have actual
knowledge as long as the plaintiff can show that their need for an accommo-
dation was a motivating factor in the employer’s decision to take action
against them.166
Likewise, employers are not exempt from Title VII liability when their
policies are facially neutral. The Court rejected this argument in Abercrom-
bie as well, reasoning that “Title VII does not demand mere neutrality with
regard to religious practices—that they be treated no worse than other prac-
tices. Rather, it gives them favored treatment . . . Title VII requires other-
wise-neutral policies to give way to the need for an accommodation.”167
Religion’s favored treatment lies in its specification in Title VII, compared
to philosophical or otherwise secular practices that are not tied to any enu-
merated classification. The reasonable accommodation standard is an indi-
vidualized version of the disparate impact theory recognized for other
protected classifications.168 Instead of looking for a disparate impact on an
entire group—members of the plaintiff’s religion, for example—the Court
ployer who operated its truck driving business on a rotating dispatch schedule); see
also Endres v. Ind. State Police, 349 F.3d 922, 926 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that
Title VII does not require law enforcement agencies to allow officers to choose their
assignments).
160. See infra Section C2.
161. E.E.O.C. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S.Ct. 2028, 2033 (2015).
162. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S.Ct. at 2031.
163. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S.Ct. at 2031.
164. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S.Ct. at 2031.
165. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S.Ct. at 2032.
166. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S.Ct. at 2032.
167. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S.Ct. at 2034.
168. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971) (explaining that the ab-
sence of discriminatory intent does not redeem a policy that operates as a “built-in
headwind” for marginalized groups and is unrelated to job performance).
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evaluates whether the challenged policy has a disparate impact on the em-
ployee’s own religious practices or beliefs. The Court’s respect for the fact
that religion is deeply personal and individualized and its avoidance of gen-
eralizations about people of any religion is tied in part to the protections
provided under the Free Exercise Clause.169
B. The Self-Identification Framework as Applied to Gender
Applied to gender, the self-identification framework would prohibit
courts from adjudicating whether an employee’s self-identified gender is
worthy of legal effect and would allow transgender and gender nonconform-
ing employees to seek accommodations when their ability to express their
gender conflicts with an employment or school policy. The legal standard
that I propose plaintiffs meet when seeking accommodations for policies
that burden their gender expression is that the behavior is a sincerely held
gender-related expression or practice. In practice, this should be analogous
to the sincerely held religious belief standard.
1. Similarities Between Gender and Religion
When the Civil Rights Act was passed in 1964, America, as a whole,
thought of sex as a more rigid mechanism for categorization than we now
know it to be. Although there was some acknowledgement that transgender
people existed, queer identity of any kind was considered a mental illness.170
The standard of care for intersex infants with ambiguous sex characteristics
169. See Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 457–58 (1988)
(holding that allowing courts to determine how central a particular tenant is to the
plaintiff’s religious beliefs would conflict with the Constitution and “cast the judici-
ary in a role [it was] never intended to play.”).
170. The first and second editions of the DSM list “homosexuality” and “transvestitism”
under Sexual Deviations. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND
STATISTICAL MANUAL: MENTAL DISORDERS 38–39 (1st ed. 1952); AMERICAN PSY-
CHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DIS-
ORDERS 44 (2d ed. 1968). The DSM-III lists “transsexualism” under Gender
Identity Disorders and “ego-dystonic homosexuality”—colloquially known as gay
panic—under Other Psychosexual Disorders. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIA-
TION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 261-64,
281-82 (3d ed. 1980). Homosexuality was removed from the DSM-III-R, except
under “sexual disorder not otherwise specified,” which was written to include persis-
tent and marked distress about one’s sexual orientation.” AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC
ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS
426 (3d ed. rev. 1987). The DSM-IV lists “gender identity disorder,” with largely
the same diagnostic criteria as “transsexualism,” under Gender Identity Disorders.
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS 532–38 (4th ed. 1994). In the DSM-V, “gender identity disor-
der” becomes “gender dysphoria,” and requires “clinically significant distress or im-
2017] R U N N I N G  F R O M  T H E  G E N D E R  P O L I C E 289
was surgical intervention to “correct” the “abnormality.”171 Men were born
men, had certain physical characteristics, and were attracted to women.
Women were born women, had different physical characteristics, and were
attracted to men. Any deviation was the result of a psychological or medical
condition that called for correction.172 Sex was thought to exist as a distinct,
immutable classification akin to nationality, ethnicity, or race.173
The current struggle courts face in differentiating discrimination on
the basis of sex from discrimination on the basis of gender identity results in
arbitrary line drawing, confusing inquiries into motive, and conflicting
judgments. This struggle reflects a legal doctrine that insists on treating gen-
der like something that can be broken up into definable groups with identi-
fiable, objective characteristics when society is beginning to understand it as
a social construct that is much more amorphous,174 giving rise to as many
ways to experience and express gender as there are people on the planet.
Because of this, only people who fit into the two neat boxes the law accom-
modates—cisgender men who experience manhood in a traditionally
pairment.” AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 451–59 (5th ed. 2013).
171. Ellen K. Feder, Tilting the Ethical Lens: Shame, Disgust, and the Body in Question, 26
HYPATIA 632, 633–35 (2011).
172. Supra note 170; SHARON E. PREVES, INTERSEX AND IDENTITY: THE CONTESTED
SELF 22 (2003).
173. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (“[S]ex, like race and na-
tional origin, is an immutable characteristic determined solely by the accident of
birth. . . . ”).
174. The Williams Institute found that “feelings thermometer” ratings, which measure
general favorability of attitudes towards the transgender community, rose thirteen
points between 2005 and 2011, from 32% to 45% of those surveyed having a
favorable attitude towards transgender people. Andrew R. Flores, National Trends in
Public Opinion on LGBT Rights in the United States, WILLIAMS INSTITUTE 16 tbl.1
(2014), https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/POP-natl-trends-
nov-2014.pdf. More recently, in a 2015 survey the Human Rights Campaign found
that 22% of likely voters reported that they personally knew a transgender person,
up from 17% in 2014. Liz Halloran, Survey Shows Striking Increase in Americans Who
Know and Support Transgender People, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN (Apr. 24, 2015),
http://www.hrc.org/blog/survey-shows-striking-increase-in-americans-who-know-
and-support-transgende. A similar survey conducted in 2016 showed an increase to
35%. National Survey of Likely Voters: Trans Visibility Matters, HUMAN RIGHTS CAM-
PAIGN, http://www.hrc.org/resources/hrc-national-survey-of-likely-voters?_ga=2.21
0933653.1415707594.1501604877-1565081548.1499408948 (last visited Nov. 10,
2017). The 2016 survey also reported that, of those who knew a transgender person,
66% had a favorable impression of transgender people, compared to 13% who felt
unfavorably about them. Id. The survey did not ask about non-binary people specifi-
cally. Id. Another recent survey of 1,000 individuals between the ages of eighteen
and thirty-four found that half thought of gender as “a spectrum, and some people
fall outside conventional categories.” Henig, supra note 9.
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masculine way and cisgender women who experience womanhood in a tra-
ditionally feminine way—are protected under a doctrine that, at the same
time, condemns sex stereotypes.
Despite the sex discrimination caselaw to the contrary, gender is more
mutable and less rigid than previously understood. There is no determinate
number of genders and two people belonging to the same gender can expe-
rience and express it in completely different and seemingly contradictory
ways. Legal scholars have wrestled with how to reconcile a legal structure
that views gender as a multiple-choice question with two mutually exclusive
answers in a world where many feel strongly about expressing their gender
in a way that does not conform to tradition and is not accepted by the
mainstream. Anton Marino describes gender as “a person’s innate core iden-
tity,” and gender expression as “the manifestation of one’s inner self.”175
Gender cannot be proven by looking at a person or their lineage or their
birth certificate. In these ways, gender resembles religion more than it re-
sembles any other protected class under Title VII. As Sue Landsittel suc-
cinctly notes, both gender and religion have a “deeply personal, internal
genesis, [and] lack a fixed external referent.”176
Courts have started to make this comparison as well. The Schroer
court compared the Library of Congress’ discrimination against Diana
Schroer to an employer’s discrimination against religious converts. The
court concluded that, because discrimination based on a change of religion
is still discrimination based on religion, discrimination based on a change in
gender must still be discrimination based on gender.177 The EEOC recog-
nized in Macy that an employer’s discrimination against a woman employee
based on the employer’s belief that the employee should be a man since she
was assigned that gender at birth is no different from an employer who
discriminates against a Christian employee because the employer believes
that the employee should be Muslim since the employee’s parents are Mus-
lim. Both are actionable.
C. Applying the Self-Identification Framework to Gender in Practice
The self-identification framework is ideal for gender because, as its
name suggests, it revolves around self-identification. When applied to relig-
ion, it not only acknowledges that, while two Christians, two Jews, or two
175. Anton Marino, Transgressions of Inequality: The Struggle Finding Legal Protections
Against Wrongful Employment Termination on the Basis of Transgender Identity, 21 AM.
U. J. OF GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 865, 871 (2013).
176. Sue Landsittel, Comment, Strange Bedfellows? Sex, Religion, and Transgender Identity
Under Title VII, 104 NW. U.L. REV. 1147, 1150 (2010).
177. Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 306–08 (D.D.C. 2008).
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Muslims might believe in and practice the same religion differently, both
interpretations are valid. It also recognizes that not everyone falls into a
finite number of categories. Some practice well-known religions, others
practice lesser-known religions, and some hold religious beliefs unique to
themselves and unconnected to any recognized religion. Likewise, many
identify outside of the well-known binary genders: man and woman. Some
identify with lesser known genders, such as agender, neutrois, or androgyne,
and others feel that no existent word adequately describes their experience
and may identify under an umbrella term, such as non-binary or gender-
queer, or invent their own word altogether. Additionally, two people who
do identify as the same gender may not experience it the same way, but
their experiences are equally valid. The self-identification framework brings
all of these people within legal protection.
Under the self-identification framework, the court would first assess
whether the plaintiff’s gender-related beliefs are sincerely held. Analogizing
to the religion cases, the court might look to whether any witnesses can
attest to the plaintiff’s beliefs, whether any documentation of the plaintiff’s
gender exists,178 whether the plaintiff engages in any behaviors (or any be-
haviors other than the one for which they are seeking an accommodation)
that the court believes are consistent with the gender they are identifying,179
whether they have been persistent in their gender or their need to express
their gender,180 and, if the plaintiff is seeking an accommodation, whether
they have told anyone they need to engage in that behavior for a gender-
related reason.181 These are examples of the evidence courts have looked for
in religious accommodation cases, and a plaintiff’s inability to produce evi-
dence for any one of these factors should not, by itself, be fatal to the plain-
tiff’s claim. If the plaintiff was seeking an accommodation, the court would
then determine whether the behavior for which the accommodation was
sought was gender-related and whether the accommodation imposed an un-
due burden.
I will now evaluate how the self-identification framework would apply
to four previously discussed cases and how it would result in outcomes that
validate, instead of disregard, all four plaintiffs’ self-identified gender.
1. Seamus Johnston and Krystal Etsitty
Seamus Johnston, a transgender former student at the University of
Pittsburgh at Johnstown, alleged that the university had him charged with
178. See Jackson v. Mann, 196 F.3d 316, 320 (2d Cir. 1999).
179. See Jackson, 196 F.3d at 320.
180. See Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1220 (10th Cir. 2007).
181. See Kay, 500 F.3d at 1220.
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criminal disorderly conduct, banned him from using the athletic center, and
ultimately expelled him for using the men’s restrooms and locker rooms.182
At the time, his driver’s license reflected that he was a man, he had begun
HRT and had his name changed on his university records, and he was regis-
tered with the Selective Service.183 Johnston sued the university for violating
Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause. He lost before the district court
and settled the case with the university.184
Krystal Etsitty was a transgender woman who began transitioning at
work shortly after being hired by the Utah Transit Authority (“UTA”) as a
bus driver.185 While her supervisor initially expressed support for her transi-
tion, she was ultimately fired because the UTA was concerned that her use
of public women’s restrooms while she was on her route would subject the
agency to liability.186 She sued the UTA for violating Title VII. The district
court granted summary judgment for the UTA, and the ruling was affirmed
by the Tenth Circuit.187
Both courts based their holdings on the plaintiffs’ anatomy. The
Pennsylvania district court called the fact that Johnston had not had bottom
surgery, or genital reconstructive surgery, “fatal to [his] sex discrimination
claim.”188 The Tenth Circuit considered the UTA’s justification for firing
Etsitty,189 that it feared lawsuits, legitimate and non-discriminatory, despite
a body of case law condemning customer preference as a justification. Simi-
larly, Johnston’s court recognized the university’s desire to keep facilities
segregated based on “biological or birth sex” as a legitimate state interest,190
despite the fact that segregation on those bases was the very behavior John-
ston was challenging as discriminatory. Under the current framework,
courts understand that sex discrimination is illegal and are willing to pro-
hibit discrimination based on outright animus toward transgender people
under some circumstances, but do not understand that the safety and pri-
vacy concerns often cited by defendants and given substantial weight by
courts are, in and of themselves, discriminatory.
182. Johnston v. Univ. of Pittsburgh of the Commonwealth Sys. of Higher Educ., 97 F.
Supp. 3d 657, 663–64 (W.D. Pa. 2015).
183. Johnston, 97 F. Supp. 3d 657 at 662–63.
184. Lauren Rosenblatt & Emily Brindley, Pitt Settles Johnston Lawsuit, Looks to Form
Trans Inclusion Group, PITT NEWS, Mar. 30, 2016, http://pittnews.com/article/
70006/news/pitt-settles-johnston-lawsuit-looks-to-form-trans-inclusion-group/.
185. Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1218–19 (10th Cir. 2007).
186. Etsitty, 502 F.3d at 1219.
187. Etsitty, 502 F.3d. at 1215–16.
188. Johnston, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 671.
189. Etsitty, 502 F.3d at 1224.
190. Johnston, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 668.
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In contrast, under the self-identification framework, the court would
only be able to evaluate whether the plaintiff’s gender was sincerely held.
Both Johnston and Etsitty would be able to provide this evidence. Johnston
had been living as a man for more than five years when his case was decided
and had a long history of identifying as male, evidenced by his informing
his parents he was a boy at age nine. He had as much documentation as a
court could reasonably expect, including a driver’s license, passport, and
social security records reflecting his gender; was registered with the Selective
Service; had his name legally changed; and could produce medical records
showing that he had been diagnosed with Gender Identity Disorder. Etsitty
had less legal documentation but had still been living as a woman in all
settings, except at work, for four years and had also been diagnosed with
Gender Identity Disorder.
In cases brought by transgender plaintiffs, the court would look to
whether the plaintiff has expressed their gender in a way typically associated
with that gender. Neither Etsitty nor Johnston asserted their gender only to
use sex-segregated facilities. They were both living as their genders in all
aspects of life, including their names and pronoun usage, their presentation,
and the fact that they were undergoing HRT.
A court might next ask whether the plaintiff has been persistent in
their need to exercise the behavior that is the subject of the lawsuit. Seamus
Johnson had a documented history of using the men’s facilities in the face
of serious consequences, including college disciplinary measures, expulsion,
and legal action. Krystal Etsitty might struggle more to show persistence
because she was apparently terminated relatively quickly after she began us-
ing the women’s restrooms at work. However, if she could show that she
was using women’s restrooms in other situations, this would weigh in her
favor.
Finally, if a plaintiff has told others that they engage in the practice at
issue for a gendered reason, the court might note this. In both Johnston and
Etsitty’s cases, this should be clear. They are seeking to use sex-segregated
facilities consistent with their self-identified gender.
These factors are merely things that courts have looked at as evidence
in religious discrimination cases, and they need not all be met for a court to
find a sincerely held belief.191 A court would be unlikely to give much
191. See e.g., Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1220 (10th Cir. 2007) (finding that a peti-
tioner’s religious belief that he needed access to tarot cards was sincere because he
persistently asked for them and was disciplined twice for obtaining them on his
own); Jackson v. Mann, 196 F.3d 316, 320 (2d Cir. 1999) (finding that a petitioner
had produced sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether his’ religious belief was sincerely held because he produced documentation
that listed his religion as Jewish, had participated in kosher meal programs in the
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weight to Krystal Etsitty’s inability to present evidence of her persistence
unless it contributed to a lack of evidence overall. No one piece of evidence
is required. For example, though both Johnston and Etsitty were diagnosed
with Gender Identity Disorder, a lack of a diagnosis would not be fatal to
an individual’s claim. Notably, courts do not recognize third party testi-
mony that the plaintiff should not receive protection because they are not
really a member of the religion192—unless the third-party testimony reflects
that the plaintiff did not believe they were really a member of the religion—
even if it comes from a religious authority. This means that, had UPJ
presented testimony that Johnston should not be protected from sex dis-
crimination because transgender men are not really men, it would be legally
meaningless. The only person whose belief matters is the plaintiff.
A court would then look to the knowledge requirement. Actual
knowledge is not required for a defendant to be found liable for religious
discrimination. The plaintiff simply must have suspected that the employee
was a member of a protected class or engaging in protected behavior and
that this suspicion motivated the adverse employment action. In both John-
ston and Etsitty’s cases, however, the defendant had actual knowledge of the
plaintiff’s gender. Etsitty informed her immediate supervisor that she was
transgender and would be using the women’s restrooms because she was a
woman. Johnston attempted to change his gender on his university records
and was told that he could not.
The court would then assess whether the practice that is the subject of
the lawsuit was gender-motivated. In religion cases, this is not usually a
lengthy inquiry. In some instances, it is not even present in the court’s
reasoning because it seems obvious. These cases would both likely fall into
that category. That Etsitty’s desire as a woman to use women’s restrooms is
gender-motivated stands without question. The same is true of Johnston.
After finding that the plaintiff’s belief is sincerely held and gender-
motivated, the court would determine whether the actions that took place
were discriminatory. The court, accepting as true that Etsitty is a woman or
that Johnston is a man, regardless of their anatomy or the gender marker on
their birth certificate, would ask if the defendant had a legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for preventing them from using the correct facilities.
Although there is no case law on point in the Third or Tenth Circuit, the
courts would likely recognize that upholding the UTA and UPJ’s asserted
past, had gone without food to avoid eating non-kosher food, and produced an
affidavit from his mother attesting that she had “raised [him] according to the Jewish
faith and dietary laws.”).
192. See Jackson v. Mann, 196 F.3d 316, 320 (2d Cir. 1999).
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justifications would give weight to societal prejudice that contravenes the
purpose of Title VII, as other circuits have.193
2. Darlene Jespersen
Darlene Jespersen was terminated from Harrah’s casino in Reno for
refusing to comply with the makeup requirement in the casino’s newly en-
forced dress code.194 The dress code was gender-neutral except that it re-
quired men to have short hair and wear no makeup or nail polish, allowed
women to wear nail polish in select colors, and required women to wear
makeup, including face powder, blush, mascara, and lipstick and have their
hair “teased, curled, or styled” while at work.195
Jespersen felt that wearing makeup “conflict[ed] with her self-image”
and caused her enough discomfort to affect her ability to work.196 She testi-
fied in her deposition that wearing makeup made her feel “degraded” and
demeaned, affected her sense of dignity, and cost her credibility as an
individual.197
The Ninth Circuit pointed to prior case law demonstrating that gen-
der-specific appearance standards alone do not offend Title VII.198 Jespersen
was therefore required to show that the appearance standard placed an une-
qual burden on women versus men. Though the court acknowledged that
an unequal burden could be obvious from the policy itself and would re-
quire no additional evidence, it did not believe that Harrah’s appearance
standard was such a policy because “grooming standards that appropriately
differentiate between the genders are not facially discriminatory.”199 The
Ninth Circuit upheld Harrah’s appearance standard because Jespersen had
not provided evidence that the policy imposed an unequal time or financial
burden on women. The dissent argued that this was not a question reasona-
bly subject to dispute because there was no doubt that wearing makeup
costs money and takes time, the policy required no similar daily routine
from men, and the court should not have “need[ed] an expert witness to
figure out that [face powder, blush, mascara, and lipstick] don’t grow on
trees.”200
193. Supra note 78 and accompanying text.
194. Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1105–06 (9th Cir. 2006).
195. Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1107.
196. Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1107–08.
197. Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1108.
198. Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1109.
199. Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1109–10 (emphasis added).
200. Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1117 (9th Cir. 2006) (Kozin-
ski, J., dissenting).
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Jespersen’s case fell victim to the court’s unwillingness to use common
sense to determine that wearing a full face of makeup costs women more
time and money on a daily basis than it costs men to simply keep their hair
short, because the court accepted as appropriate the employer’s ability to
decide that women should be required to wear makeup in order to look
“professional and very similar”201 despite a concurrent determination that
men look professional and similar enough without adding anything to their
faces.
Though Darlene Jespersen was not transgender, her desire not to wear
makeup would have been protected under the self-identification framework.
The court would first go through the process of determining whether Jes-
persen’s feeling that not wearing makeup was an essential part of her gender
expression was a sincerely held belief. In this instance, expecting documen-
tation would not be reasonable, but Jespersen might be able to produce
witnesses willing to sign affidavits expressing that she felt strongly about not
wearing makeup. The weightiest piece of evidence in Jespersen’s favor is
that she worked at the casino for twenty years and did not wear makeup on
or off the job during that time. Then, when Harrah’s began enforcing the
dress policy and actually requiring women employees to wear makeup, she
refused, even though it resulted in her termination. This consistency of
practice and persistence in the face of adversity would probably be enough
to persuade a court that her belief that she could not wear makeup was
sincerely held.
The court would then need to determine whether Jespersen’s desire to
not wear makeup was gender-related. This would be a more thorough in-
quiry than in Seamus Johnston and Krystal Etsitty’s cases, because, while
makeup is gendered, the connection is less obviously related to gender than
a woman wanting to use the women’s restroom. Jespersen testified to how
she felt about wearing makeup when she initially tried to comply with the
appearance standard after first being hired at Harrah’s in her deposition:
I felt very degraded and very demeaning. [sic] I actually felt sick
that I had to cover up my face and become pretty or feminine in
a sex stereotyping role to keep my job or to do my job. I actually
felt ill and I felt violated. . . . It prohibited me from doing my
job. I felt exposed. I actually felt like I was naked. I mean, I—I
felt that I—that I was being pushed into having to be revealed or
forced to be feminine to do that job. . . . I felt that I had become
dolled up and that I was a sexual object. . . . It was too harmful.
It affected my self-dignity. It portrayed me in a role that I wasn’t
201. Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1109.
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comfortable, that I wasn’t taken seriously as myself. I also felt
that it took away my credibility as an individual and as a per-
son. . . . I went home and threw the makeup in the garbage.202
Jespersen’s testimony contains multiple mentions of how she felt un-
comfortable with how feminine the policy required her to look. She implies
that she did not feel like herself when she was wearing makeup and de-
scribes feeling physically ill when she saw herself with makeup on. The vis-
ceral reaction Jespersen describes gets at something more fundamental than
a political belief that a woman should not have to wear makeup if she does
not want to. It shows that Jespersen’s refusal to wear makeup is tied to her
identity.
Unlike Johnston and Etsitty who wished to be treated like people of
their gender who were assigned that gender a birth, Jespersen would need to
seek an accommodation exempting her from a policy that lawfully distin-
guishes between men and women. This puts Jespersen’s case squarely in the
area of accommodations.
To make out a prima facie case of sex discrimination, Jespersen would
have to show that her gender presentation conflicted with her employer’s
policies and this conflict was the reason for her termination. This much was
uncontested by the parties. The burden then shifts to Harrah’s to show that
either it offered Jespersen a reasonable accommodation or that any accom-
modation would impose an undue hardship on the company. While Har-
rah’s allowed Jespersen to look into other positions with the company, she
did not find any positions she was qualified for that had a similar pay
scale.203 In any case, a court is unlikely to decide that forcing an employee
to transfer to an entirely different position is a reasonable accommodation
because Title VII guarantees employees the right to work in the position of
their preference. In Jespersen’s case, the circumstances would have necessi-
tated a switch from bartender to room attendant or bellhop, for which she
was not immediately qualified 204
Likewise, a court is unlikely to determine that the accommodation
Jespersen would request, an exemption from the makeup requirement in the
appearance standards, would impose an undue hardship on her employer.205
202. Deposition of Darlene Betty Jespersen at 138–39, Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating
Co., 280 F. Supp. 2d 1189 (D. Nev. 2002) (No. 01-0401).
203. See Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1108.
204. Deposition, supra note 202, at 80.
205. In the past, courts have found accommodations unreasonable when they would re-
quire an employer to hire additional labor or undergo a loss in production or when
the employee requests priority in the employer’s allotment of a coveted, limited re-
source, such as time off on Saturdays. E.g., Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison,
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Here, Harrah’s only possible argument is that the atmosphere they are try-
ing to project to their customers requires their employees to look uniform
and professional and that allowing Jespersen to not wear makeup would
distract from that objective. This justification would fail because courts have
rejected the idea that customer preferences and the desire to project a cer-
tain image to customers cannot be used to rationalize a discriminatory pol-
icy.206 This reasoning should extend to an employer’s refusal to provide an
accommodation as well. Therefore, under this new standard, Darlene Jes-
persen would prevail on the facts of her case.
3. Wilma Wood
Wilma Wood, an intersex woman, was passed over for promotion and
later terminated from her employment with C.G. Studios after her em-
ployer discovered that she had undergone “gender corrective surgery” prior
to being hired.207 Wood brought a lawsuit against C.G. Studios, alleging
that her termination was a result of sex discrimination in violation of Title
VII.
The District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania deter-
mined that Title VII was not intended to protect against discrimination on
the basis of surgical status.208 In doing so, the court cited cases denying
protection to transgender plaintiffs209 and emphasized that the term “sex”
should be interpreted based on its “traditional meaning.”210
Wood’s case is different from Johnston’s, Etsitty’s, or Jespersen’s be-
cause Wood’s case does not lie in an area where gender classifications are
legal. Wood was terminated from her employment on the basis of her inter-
sex status and the court simply refused to credit this as sex discrimination,
instead characterizing it as discrimination based on surgical status. While
the court does not give much information about the facts of Wilma Wood’s
432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977) (holding that requiring an employer to subvert a seniority
system for assigning off days to give the plaintiff Saturdays off imposed an undue
burden); Endres v. Ind. State Police, 349 F.3d 922, 926 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding
that allowing a police officer with a religious objection to gambling to refuse to
provide full-time services at a casino imposed an undue burden); Brown v. Polk Cty,
61 F.3d 650, 655 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that requiring an employer to allow the
employee-plaintiff to have his secretary type up his Bible study notes on the clock
would impose an undue burden); Lee v. ABF Freight Sys., Inc., 22 F.3d 1019, 1023
(10th Cir. 1994) (holding that requiring an employer to subvert a rotating dispatch
schedule to give the plaintiff Saturdays off imposed an undue burden).
206. See supra note 76; note 77.
207. Wood v. C.G. Studios, Inc., 660 F. Supp. 176, 176 (E.D. Penn. 1987).
208. Wood, 660 F. Supp. at 177.
209. Wood, 660 F. Supp. at 178.
210. Wood, 660 F. Supp. at 178.
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case, plaintiffs like her would also be protected under the self-identification
framework.
Under the self-identification framework, Wood would have two avail-
able arguments. First, she could argue that she was, in fact, terminated be-
cause she had surgery and that her termination for that reason was sex
discrimination because the surgery was connected to her gender. Second,
she could argue that she was terminated because she did not conform to her
employer’s binary concept of gender.
Under the first theory, Wood would need to show that she had a
sincerely held belief that she was a woman and that her surgery was related
to that belief. This would not be an issue for her. All of Wood’s legal docu-
ments reflected that she was a woman. She had presumably lived as a
woman for her entire life. She presented in a way traditionally associated
with being a woman. She went by a name and pronouns that are also associ-
ated with being a woman. She would have had no problem producing affi-
davits from witnesses testifying that she identified as a woman. This is more
than enough evidence to show a sincerely held belief. Likewise, Wood
would easily be able to explain that her surgery was gender-related. While it
is unclear from the available documents how old Wood was when she un-
derwent this operation, the surgery brought her body into line with how
either she or her parents felt that she needed to look in order to embody her
gender. Once Wood made these showings, her case would become analo-
gous to the case of an employee who was fired after their employer discov-
ered that they engaged in a religious practice the employer did not approve
of, such as taking time to pray at certain times of day. In both instances, an
employee has been fired because of behavior directly related to their pro-
tected status, surgery to gender and prayer breaks to religion. This clearly
falls under Title VII’s purview. However, this theory would be unavailable
to intersex plaintiffs who suffered an adverse action because they were inter-
sex, not because of any surgery or medical intervention related to their gen-
der. Likewise, the many intersex people who feel that the surgeries they have
undergone do not affirm their gender may be unwilling to make this
argument.
Under the second theory, Wood would argue that she was terminated
not because her employer found her surgery itself distasteful, but because
her employer simply did not like that she was intersex. Wood would need to
show that she was a member of the protected class—that she was intersex—
and that this status was the motivating factor in her termination. Although
Wood would not need to show all the elements of the surgery sex discrimi-
nation claim under this theory, in some ways it may be a more difficult case
for her. She would need to produce evidence that her intersex status was the
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real reason for her termination, which may be difficult if her employer only
explicitly objected to the surgery itself, and not her intersex status.
D. Applying the Self-Identification Framework to Non-Binary Plaintiffs
The self-identification framework would protect non-binary plaintiffs
from discrimination they might experience because they are non-binary or
engage in behavior that is connected to their non-binary gender. This in-
cludes using a name and/or pronouns that are commonly associated with a
gender different from the gender with which their presentation is associated,
switching gender presentation from day to day, mixing clothing bought in
the men’s section and clothing bought in the women’s section or otherwise
presenting androgynously, and using they/them/their pronouns or neo-pro-
nouns. Like the plaintiffs discussed above, non-binary plaintiffs would have
to demonstrate that they suffered an adverse employment action because of
their non-binary gender, lack of gender, or gender-related behaviors in
which they engaged to make out a prima facie case of discrimination. The
burden would then shift to the employer or educator to show that they
either offered a reasonable accommodation or that any potential accommo-
dation would have been an undue burden.
1. Sincerely Held Belief
Like in Darlene Jespersen’s case, in order to be entitled to an accom-
modation, a court would first have to determine whether the plaintiff sin-
cerely believed that they belonged to the gender they identified and, if the
adverse action was the result of a behavior, whether that behavior was gen-
der-related. Because only a few states currently allow individuals to obtain
gender markers that reflect their non-binary identity on their legal docu-
ments,211 it would be difficult for non-binary plaintiffs to provide the legal
documentation of their gender that Seamus Johnston was able to provide.
Similarly, because non-binary individuals are somewhat less likely than bi-
nary transgender individuals to have undergone any type of medical transi-
tion, that component may also be absent.
211. Oregon and Washington, D.C. allow residents to select a gender-neutral option on
their driver’s licenses. California will allow residents to select a gender-neutral option
on driver’s licenses and birth certificates starting on January 1, 2019. Christina
Caron, Californian Will Soon Have Nonbinary as a Gender Option on Birth Certifi-
cates, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2017,  https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/19/us/birth-c
ertificate-nonbinary-gender-california.html; Daniella Diaz, Brown signs law OK’ing
third option for gender on California driver’s licenses, CNN POLITICS, Oct. 17, 2017,
http://www.cnn.com/2017/10/17/politics/governor-jerry-brown-california-law-non
binary/index.html.
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However, these factors are not required. Plaintiffs may be able to pro-
vide emails where they notified their colleagues or professors of their gender
and asked them to use certain pronouns or blog posts they wrote referencing
their gender. They would also be allowed to produce affidavits from third
parties attesting to their gender and any other evidence they might have
supporting their gender, just as binary transgender plaintiffs are allowed to
do. For plaintiffs who suffered an adverse action because of their gender
alone and who are not seeking an accommodation, this is where the inquiry
ends. The court should proceed to evaluate the case just as it does the case
of a cisgender man or woman alleging discrimination.
For plaintiffs who are seeking an accommodation for a behavior re-
lated to their gender expression, the court must take its inquiry a step fur-
ther and evaluate whether the plaintiff sincerely believes they need to engage
in that behavior as a part of their gender expression. To make this showing,
the plaintiff might, again, produce affidavits attesting to the importance the
plaintiff places on wearing clothing designed for both men and women at
the same time or using certain restrooms. Testimony that this importance
was related to a part of the plaintiff’s gender expression would be even
stronger evidence. The Court might look at whether the plaintiff has been
persistent in their need to engage in the behavior, although courts should
not penalize plaintiffs who conformed to their employer’s wishes to keep
their jobs after being told their employer would not tolerate the behavior.
Additionally, the court might assess whether the plaintiff engages in any
other behaviors that it believes are consistent with the plaintiff’s gender.
This factor presents a potential difficulty because it is inherently tied
to stereotypes and because most judges are unlikely to know what types of
expression are consistent with non-binary genders and to understand that
there is no one way to express a non-binary identity, and that is the point. I
speculate that plaintiffs who present androgynously, use neutral pronouns,
and go by a gender-neutral name will have an easier time than plaintiffs
who present as traditionally male or female at persuading a court that the
component of gender expression at issue is sincerely held. The plaintiffs
who would struggle the most to demonstrate a sincerely held belief are likely
to be non-binary plaintiffs who express their gender in a way commonly
associated with the gender they were assigned at birth in every way except
the behavior for which they are seeking an accommodation. For example, a
non-binary employee who was assigned male at birth, went by the name,
“Jonathan,” used he/him/his pronouns, maintained short hair and had facial
hair, and wore suits, shoes, and a watch designed for men would struggle
more to show that his desire to wear makeup was sincerely held than an
employee who was assigned male at birth, but went by the name “Ari,” used
xe/xem/xir pronouns, wore nail polish, and kept xir hair long or wore suits
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and boots designed for women. However, if Jonathan could show that he
had been publicly identifying as non-binary and wearing makeup in other
contexts for a significant amount of time, this should still be enough to
demonstrate a sincerely held belief. After all, sincerely held belief is a low
bar because courts recognize that it is not their place to play religion police.
The constitutional scheme I will propose in the next Section would require
courts to treat gender with the same caution.
Additionally, a non-binary plaintiff who had recently come out and
was just starting to present themselves in the way that they felt expressed
their gender may also struggle under this standard. That plaintiff would
likely need to show that they were publicly identifying as their gender and
engaging in the behaviors they wished to have accommodated across multi-
ple settings, and would probably need to be able to articulate to the judge
why the way they were presenting before was not a true expression of their
gender. If there is one personal detail that has a potential to be openly
argued about during litigation and discussed in an opinion the way that
anatomy currently is in cases with transgender plaintiffs, it is the coming
out stories of plaintiffs who worked or attended school with the defendant
for a long time before seeking accommodations because they were not out
yet.
2. Gender-Related Behavior
After deciding that the behavior for which the plaintiff was seeking an
accommodation was part of a sincerely held belief about their gender, the
court would move on to whether the behavior was gender-related; in other
words, whether it was a component of the plaintiff’s gender expression.
Whether a plaintiff would struggle to make this showing depends largely on
how gendered the judge perceives the behavior in question to be. A plaintiff
who wants to use the restroom or locker room that more closely aligns with
their gender or who wants certain pronouns used would probably struggle
less than a plaintiff who wants to wear makeup, jewelry, nail polish, or
certain hair styles, who would struggle less than a plaintiff who wants to
wear facial piercings or dye their hair a bright color.
These problems are inherent in asking a court to assess whether a cer-
tain behavior is part of the gender expression of a person when that person’s
gender is not well known, is much less rigid in its stereotypes and expecta-
tions than the two widely recognized genders, and values things that most
would not recognize as being associated with gender at all. Some non-binary
people feel that their brightly colored hair, half sleeve of tattoos, or eyebrow
piercing are expressions of their gender in a way that cisgender men and
women might feel about facial hair or makeup, but these things are not
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thought of as being gendered because they are not gendered for men and
women.
When courts make this inquiry as part of religious discrimination
cases, they ask the plaintiff to articulate the scope of the belief and use the
plaintiff’s statement to determine whether the belief is religious in nature or
whether it stems from some other political, philosophical, or moral ideol-
ogy.212 Courts should be expected to do the same in gender cases. In these
situations, judges will probably expect plaintiffs to identify physical discom-
fort and emotional pain, as these are the narratives most judges will associ-
ate with transgender people, and plaintiffs should be wary of discussing
theoretical concepts that may make their expression look like a political
statement to a judge.
Analogizing from religion cases, judges should not consider whether
the plaintiff’s gender is widely recognized, whether the plaintiff’s expression
is a common practice among individuals who identify with the plaintiff’s
gender, whether individuals who identify with the plaintiff’s gender con-
sider the plaintiff to be a member of their gender, or whether the plaintiff is
struggling with their gender. This means that courts should not consider as
relevant that the plaintiff previously came out as a different gender, as is
common for non-binary people, or that the plaintiff is not sure which non-
binary gender, if any, they identify with. The court’s only consideration
should be whether the expression that conflicts with the school or em-
ployer’s practice is a means through which the plaintiff expresses their
gender.
Judges may be tempted to assess how critical to the plaintiff’s gender
expression the behavior is. However, Courts have repeatedly decided that it
is not their place to determine how important a practice is to a plaintiff’s
religious beliefs in determining whether a practice should be afforded pro-
tection because doing so would require the court to assume that it knows
more about the plaintiff’s religious beliefs than the plaintiff themself.213
Again, the constitutional argument I outline in the next Section would for-
bid courts from engaging in this analysis toward gender expression. There-
fore, courts should not be able to determine that a behavior must be
“central” to the plaintiff’s gender expression to be protected.
3. Reasonable Accommodations
After a plaintiff demonstrates that they suffered an adverse action be-
cause of a component of their gender expression, and after the court
212. See Thomas v. Review Bd. Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 713 (1981).
213. Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 457–58 (1988).
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determines that the plaintiff sincerely believes they must engage in the be-
havior as a part of their gender expression, the defendant must show that
they either offered the plaintiff a reasonable accommodation or that any
accommodation would be an undue hardship.214 The accommodation of-
fered to the plaintiff does not have to be the plaintiff’s most preferred ac-
commodation, even if the plaintiff can show that their preferred
accommodation would not be an undue hardship on the defendant.215 Ad-
ditionally, circuit courts differ on whether an accommodation must com-
pletely eliminate the conflict between the employer’s policies and the
employee’s beliefs in order to be considered reasonable or whether the em-
ployer may require some sacrifices from the employee.216
Most religious accommodation cases in which courts have found un-
due hardships are cases where an employee was regularly unable to work on
certain days of the week. Those cases are irrelevant here, as an employee is
unlikely to consistently need a certain day of the week off because of their
gender. Non-binary plaintiffs might worry about employers arguing that
accommodating a visibly gender non-conforming plaintiff would impose an
undue hardship because it would alienate their conservative customer base.
This argument would be impermissible because every appellate court that
has considered the issue has held that discriminatory customer preferences
are no defense to discrimination.217
Non-binary individuals should be more concerned about accommoda-
tions an employer or school could offer that a court might find reasonable
but that would not be adequate for the plaintiff. I will walk through three
examples that demonstrate how these situations might play out.
214. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (Westlaw through P.L. 115-82).
215. Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 68 (1986).
216. Compare E.E.O.C. v. Firestone Fibers & Textiles, Co., 515 F.3d 307, 314 (4th Cir.
2008) (“A duty of ‘reasonableness’ cannot be read as an invariable duty to eliminate
the conflict between workplace rules and religious practice.”), with Baker v. Home
Depot, 445 F.3d 541, 548 (2nd Cir. 2006) (“The offered accommodation cannot be
considered reasonable . . . because it does not eliminate the conflict between the
employment requirement and the religious practice.”) (quoting E.E.O.C. v. Ilona of
Hungary, Inc., 108 F.3d 1569, 1576 (7th Cir. 1997)), and Opuku-Boateng v. Cali-
fornia, 95 F.3d 1461, 1467 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Where the negotiations do not pro-
duce a proposal by the employer that would eliminate the religious conflict, the
employer must either accept the employee’s proposal or demonstrate that it would
cause an undue hardship were it to do so.”).
217. See Chaney v. Plainfield Healthcare Ctr., 612 F.3d 908, 913 (7th Cir. 2010); Ferrill
v. Parker Group, Inc., 168 F.3d 468, 473 (11th Cir. 1999); Bradley v. Pizzaco of
Neb., Inc., 7 F.3d 795, 799 (8th Cir. 1993); Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d
1273, 1276 (9th Cir. 1981); Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385,
387, 389 (5th Cir. 1971).
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Jason is an androgyne employee who wants to grow a beard and wear
makeup. They are seeking an accommodation from a gender-specific office
dress code that allows women to wear makeup and allows men to keep
neatly trimmed facial hair but prohibits men from wearing makeup. Jason’s
employer offered to let them either grow a beard or wear makeup, but not
both at the same time. Because Jason’s employer requires them to present as
either traditionally masculine or traditionally feminine but not as androgy-
nous, it is clear that Jason’s employer’s request is motivated by discomfort
(either the employer’s, other employees’, or customers’) with Jason’s androg-
ynous gender expression. An offer for an accommodation meant to mini-
mize the visibility of Jason’s gender that is motivated by prejudice against
individuals of Jason’s gender and other non-binary genders or individuals
who express their gender the way Jason does is unlikely to be found reasona-
ble by a court. Jason should win their case.
Alex is a genderfluid employee who shifts between being a man and
being a woman. She goes by she/her/hers pronouns when she is a woman
and he/him/his pronouns when she is a man. Her employer does not want
to ask other employees to switch back and forth and has offered to use they/
them/their pronouns all the time instead. Pronoun use is generally thought
of as being very gendered, but here, a judge’s ignorance regarding gender
fluidity might cause the judge to incorrectly believe that consistent use of
neutral pronouns is no different from sometimes using one set of commonly
gender pronouns and sometimes using a different set. Alex’s case may come
down to her ability to articulate to a judge that masculinity and femininity
do not cancel each other out to equal neutrality and that, while she/her/hers
pronouns do not describe her sometimes and he/him/his pronouns do not
describe her sometimes, they/them/their pronouns do not describe her ever.
Incorrect pronouns are not a reasonable alternative to correct ones. While it
may be slightly more difficult for Alex’s colleagues to switch the pronouns
they use for her, slight inconvenience cannot be considered an undue hard-
ship. Alex should win her case.
Sage is a neutrois employee who uses the men’s restroom. Xir em-
ployer has asked xem to use a gender-neutral single stall restroom instead.
Because Sage is non-binary, a judge may have a difficult time understanding
why a gender-neutral restroom is not a reasonable accommodation, espe-
cially if Sage does not identify as male-aligned and presents androgynously.
Sage’s best argument is probably that, in requiring xem to use the single stall
restroom, xir employer is drawing attention to the fact that Sage is different
from xir colleagues and depriving xem of the community that comes with
being included in a group because Sage is the only non-binary employee in
the office. Xe could argue that this is discriminatory in itself. Sage’s em-
ployer would probably argue that he is simply treating Sage as xir gender,
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that Sage is neither a man nor a woman and should use neither the men’s
nor women’s restrooms, and that this cannot possible be discriminatory.
The result of this case would depend on how sympathetic the judge is to-
ward non-binary plaintiffs.
Although I have applied it here, the sincerely held belief standard that
courts use to determine whether a belief or behavior is entitled to accommo-
dation is not outlined in Title VII. Rather, this language comes from First
Amendment Free Exercise case law. Therefore, we need a constitutional
hook in order to justify applying this language to gender. In the following
Section, I outline a Fourteenth Amendment Due Process right to self-
identification.
IV. THE DUE PROCESS RIGHT TO SELF-IDENTIFY
In the following Section, I argue that the Supreme Court should rec-
ognize a Due Process right to self-identify one’s gender under the Four-
teenth Amendment. A substantive Due Process argument would be more
inclusive for non-binary plaintiffs than an Equal Protection argument.
While a holding that transgender people are a protected class under the
Equal Protection Clause could be interpreted to protect only people whose
genders have been legally recognized, just as sex as a protected class has been
interpreted to exclude transgender people, a holding that the Due Process
Clause protects an individual’s ability to self-identify their gender could not
be cabined to exclude non-binary people. Additionally, a Due Process vic-
tory would necessarily prevent courts from refusing protection to non-bi-
nary plaintiffs based on a belief that their gender does not exist in a way that
an Equal Protection victory would not. A constitutional right to self-iden-
tify would entitle an individual’s own concept of their gender to the defer-
ence allowed under the sincerely held belief standard because it would
operate, like the Free Exercise Clause, to take gender out of the category of
things courts are able to adjudicate based on their own understanding of the
party’s gender or the understanding of third parties.
A. Prior Case Law in the Realm of Personal Autonomy
In Obergefell v. Hodges, the Supreme Court recognized that, in addi-
tion to the liberties protected under the Bill of Rights, the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “extend[s] to certain personal choices
central to individual dignity and autonomy, including intimate choices that
define personal identity and beliefs.”218 While Obergefell was not decided
218. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 2597 (2015).
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until 2015, the Supreme Court’s case law over the past century reflects this
ideology.
The Court’s substantive Due Process cases can be broken into three
categories: cases extending the right to marry, cases recognizing parental
autonomy in making decisions about children, and cases recognizing rights
related to bodily autonomy. All three lines of cases are interconnected and
reflect the Court’s firm belief that decisions that get at the core of who an
individual is should be left to the individual alone, and the government
should play no role in legislating who an individual can be. I will collec-
tively refer to these cases as the personal autonomy cases.
1. Marriage’s Connection to Identity:
Loving, Zablocki, and Obergefell
When the Supreme Court was laying the groundwork for a funda-
mental right to marry in Loving v. Virginia, it stated that “[t]he freedom to
marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential
to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.”219 The Loving Court fo-
cused largely on Equal Protection and the racially discriminatory nature of
the anti-miscegenation statute at issue, but it concluded by proclaiming
that:
Marriage is one of the ‘basic civil rights of man,’ fundamental to
our very existence and survival. To deny this fundamental free-
dom on so unsupportable a basis as the racial classifications em-
bodied in these statutes . . . is surely to deprive all the [s]tate’s
citizens of liberty without due process of law. The Fourteenth
Amendment requires that the freedom of choice to marry not be
restricted by invidious racial discriminations. Under our Consti-
tution, the freedom to marry or not marry, a person of another
race resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by the
[s]tate.220
As early as 1967, the Court acknowledged marriage as a choice so
fundamental and so tied up in the pursuit of happiness that the state could
not be allowed to interfere. While the bulk of the opinion discussed the
statute’s codification of white supremacy, the Court suggested that because
of marriage’s status as a component on which individuals build lives, the
fact that the state of Virginia placed any limitations on which individuals
219. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
220. Loving, 388 U.S. at 12 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma ex
rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)).
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could marry would have, on its own, constituted a substantive due process
violation sufficient to invalidate the statute.
The Court next considered state limitations on marriage in Zablocki v.
Redhail, when it invalidated a Wisconsin statute prohibiting parents with
minor children not in their custody and who could not prove they were up
to date on their child support payments from marrying, absent a court order
granting permission.221 The Zablocki Court inched closer to describing the
decision to marry or not marry as one that takes part in shaping an individ-
ual’s core identity. The Court referred to marriage as “the most important
relation in life,”222 “the relationship that is the foundation of the family,”223
quoted language from Griswold v. Connecticut that describes marriage as
“intimate to the degree of being sacred”224 and “an association for as noble a
purpose as any involved in our prior decisions,”225 and echoed Loving’s
“freedom of choice” language.226 Zablocki further confirmed that laws that
restrict the right to marry but that are not motivated by an invidious desire
to discriminate must still be subjected to “rigorous scrutiny” by courts if
they “significantly interfere with decisions to enter into the marital
relationship.”227
Obergefell v. Hodges begins with the sentence: “The Constitution
promises liberty to all within its reach, a liberty that includes certain specific
rights that allow persons, within a lawful realm, to define and express their
identity.”228 The Court further stated that “the decision whether and whom
to marry is among life’s momentous acts of self-definition.”229 Here, the
Court solidified the connection it had been building for fifty years between
marriage as a fundamental right and marriage as a choice that shapes per-
sonal identity. Obergefell also emphasized the concept of dignity in the sub-
stantive due process doctrine. The Obergefell Court directly compared the
dignity and autonomy of same-sex couples to make the “profound” choice
to marry with the dignity and autonomy granted to interracial couples in
1967,230 demonstrating that dignity, autonomy, and personal identity
played roles in that decision, though they were not directly referenced. The
221. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 375 (1978).
222. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 384 (quoting Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888)).
223. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 386.
224. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 384 (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486
(1965)).
225. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 384 (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at 486).
226. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 387; Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
227. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 384–86.
228. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 2593 (2015).
229. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599 (quoting Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798
N.E.2d 941, 955 (Mass. 2003)).
230. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599.
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Court eventually held that same-sex couples are entitled to this dignity of
self-determination under the Constitution.231
2. Parenting and Family Identity:
Meyer, Pierce, Stanley, Moore, and Troxel
In Meyer v. Nebraska, the Supreme Court overturned a state law
prohibiting instructors from teaching children any language other than En-
glish before the child had successfully completed eighth grade, even at a
parent’s request.232 The Nebraska legislature’s purpose in passing this law
was to ensure that children developed an American identity.233 The Su-
preme Court of Nebraska defined the state interest in its opinion upholding
the statute:
To allow the children of foreigners, who had emigrated here, to
be taught from early childhood the language of the country of
their parents was to rear them with that language as their mother
tongue. It was to educate them so that they must always think in
that language, and, as a consequence, naturally inculcate in them
the ideas and sentiments foreign to the best interests of this
country. The statute, therefore, was intended not only to require
that the education of all children be conducted in the English
language, but that, until they had grown into that language and
until it had become a part of them, they should not in the schools
be taught any other language.234
Clear xenophobia aside, the Court did not directly engage with the
identity interest at stake in Meyer. It overturned the statute based on the
rights of parents to control their children’s education and the rights of stu-
dents to learn,235 but the identity issues inherent in growing up in an immi-
grant community where another language is frequently spoken or in a
household where a language other than English is spoken at home are plain.
The Nebraska legislature’s intent was to deprive these children of their cul-
ture and ensure that they grew up identifying with American cultural ideals
instead, based on an incorrect understanding that children who grow up
231. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2608 (“[Petitioners] ask for equal dignity in the eyes of
the law. The Constitution grants them that right.”).
232. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 397 (1923).
233. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401.
234. Meyer v. State, 187 N.W. 100, 102 (Neb. 1922) (emphasis added).
235. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401 (“[T]he legislature has attempted materially to interfere with
. . . the opportunities of pupils to acquire knowledge, and the power of parents to
control the education of their own.”).
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immersed in another culture will identify as citizens of their parents’ coun-
try of origin instead of the United States.
The Court engaged with identity interests more directly two years
later in Pierce v. Society of Sisters when it invalidated an Oregon law requir-
ing all children to attend public schools.236 It described Oregon’s law as an
attempt to “standardize its children,”237 recognizing that where a child at-
tends school plays a role in shaping their identity. The Court concluded
that “the child is not the mere creature of the state; those who nurture him
and direct his destiny have the right . . . to recognize and prepare him for
additional obligations.”238 Meyer and Pierce together represent clear refuta-
tions of the idea that a state can legislate in order to mold children into the
people it wants them to be.
In Stanley v. Illinois and Moore v. City of East Cleveland, the Court
considered the attempts of a legislature to define the composition of a fam-
ily. Stanley dealt with an Illinois statute making a child of unwed parents a
ward of the state after their mother died.239 Moore revolved around an East
Cleveland city housing ordinance defining families who may live together in
single family housing to a narrow category of related individuals.240 Illinois
defined a parent as adoptive parents, both the mother and father of a legiti-
mate child, or the mother of an illegitimate child,241 while the city of East
Cleveland defined family in a way that excluded the plaintiff, Inez Moore,
her son, and her two grandsons, who were cousins.242 The Court invalidated
both laws under the Due Process Clause. The Stanley Court held that the
plaintiff’s interest in the “companionship, care, custody and management of
his . . . children”243 came before the Court with the “momentum for re-
spect” of a fundamental right.244 The language the Court used implied that
it considered the plaintiff’s ability to take care of his family an aspect of his
identity as a father, of which Illinois could not deprive him without a hear-
ing on his fitness as a parent.245
236. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 536
(1925).
237. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535.
238. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535.
239. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 646 (1972).
240. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 495–96 (1977).
241. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 650.
242. Moore, 431 U.S. at 500.
243. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651.
244. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651 (quoting Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 95 (1949) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring)).
245. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972) (“Under the Due Process Clause
that advantage [of administrative convenience] is insufficient to justify refusing a
father a hearing with the issue at stake is the dismemberment of his family.”).
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In Moore, the Court discussed the family’s impact on a person’s iden-
tity.246 It once again accused the government of attempting to “standardize
its children”247 by requiring them to live only in nuclear families. The Court
held that fundamental family rights, such as the right to choose to live to-
gether as a family, cannot be cut off at the arbitrary boundary of the nuclear
family.248 Here, the Court recognized a right among individuals who are
related to self-identify as a family and live together in single-family housing.
The Court stated that this right “may not lightly be denied by the
[s]tate.”249
Finally, in Troxel v. Granville, the Court evaluated a Washington stat-
ute that deprived parents of their ability to decide those persons with whom
their children interacted. The statute allowed a court to award visitation to
any third party at any time, as long as the court determined that visitation
would be in the best interest of the child.250 The Supreme Court took issue
with the fact that the law afforded no deference to a parent’s determination
that contact with the third party would not be in the child’s best interest,251
passing the role of making these crucial decisions to the courts. The Wash-
ington statute enabled courts to serve as second or third parents to children,
absent any indication that the child’s parent’s decision-making should be
questioned, removing from parents an essential part of their identity as a
parent.252
3. Bodily Autonomy as Essential to Identity: The Contraception and
Abortion Cases and Lawrence
While technically an Equal Protection case, Skinner v. Oklahoma set
the stage for bodily autonomy as an identity right by recognizing the choice
to procreate as a basic liberty.253 The Court was clear that procreation’s
status as “one of the basic civil rights of man”254 was instrumental to its
246. See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 504 (1977) (“It is through the
family that we inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished values, moral
and cultural.”).
247. Moore, 413 U.S. at 506 (quoting Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 286 U.S. 510, 535
(1925)).
248. Moore, 413 U.S. at 502.
249. Moore, 413 U.S. at 505–06.
250. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 67 (2000).
251. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 67.
252. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68–69 (“[S]o long as a parent adequately cares for his or her
children . . . there will normally be no reason for the State to inject itself into the
private realm of the family to further question the ability of that parent to make the
best decisions concerning the rearing of that parent’s children.”).
253. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
254. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541.
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holding. The Court went on to discuss how allowing the state the power to
sterilize its citizens causes “irreparable injury” and allowed the individual
“no redemption.”255 The Court held that this intrusion into the autonomy
of the individual, which had permanent consequences, was impermissible.
The contraception cases connect bodily autonomy to personal iden-
tity. If not for the groundwork it laid in the bodily autonomy doctrine,
Griswold v. Connecticut might be better classified as a marriage case. The
Court’s reasoning in striking down a statute prohibiting individuals, includ-
ing married couples, from using contraceptives revolves around preserving
the integrity of the marital relationship.256 The Court’s invalidation of the
Connecticut statute demonstrated its unwillingness to allow a state legisla-
ture to act as the third party in a marriage the same way it was later unwill-
ing to allow Washington state courts to act as parents to children in Troxel.
Such an intrusion, the Court found, would have a “maximum destructive
impact”257 on marital relationships by rendering decisions made privately
between spouses about matters that would have such an extreme impact on
their lives no more “sacred” than any other decision, thereby stripping from
marriage its identifying features and rendering its participants’ identities as
married individuals meaningless.
Eisenstadt v. Baird took this reasoning to the next step, holding that
the right to make a decision “so fundamentally affecting a person as the
decision whether to bear or beget a child” was not limited only to married
couples, but extended to all individuals.258 The Court soundly rejected the
idea that a legislature could prescribe a child as the punishment for sex
outside of marriage.259 It reasoned that, while Griswold revolved around the
marital relationship, individuals maintain their separate identities within
marriage and do not gain or lose individual rights when they marry.260 Ei-
senstadt stands for the idea that an unmarried individual may make the criti-
cal decision of whether to become a parent, but it also stands for the
concept that unmarried individuals may not be coerced into marriage by
255. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541.
256. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965).
257. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485.
258. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
259. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 448. This was true despite the fact that fornication was a
misdemeanor in Massachusetts at the time. See 272 Mass. Gen. Laws § 18;.Andrew
Carden & Kristen Lee, Antiquated State Laws Stir Modern-Day Worry, BOSTON
GLOBE, Jan. 3, 2013,  https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2013/01/03/antiquated-
mass-laws-stir-modern-day-worry/zKkq0WXosc51wbIWg0z9nJ/story.html (“Massa-
chusetts is not the only state that still outlaws fornication (1692). . . .”).
260. See Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453 (“[T]he marital couple is not an independent entity
with a mind and heart of its own, but an association of two individuals each with a
separate intellectual and emotional makeup.”).
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legislatures who may prefer that their citizens fall into a single type of family
structure, as the legislature in Moore did, by withholding individual rights
from its citizens until they are married. People have the right to make deci-
sions at the core of their identity, whether married or unmarried.
In Roe v. Wade, the Court noted that the ability to terminate a preg-
nancy implicated the right to privacy against government intrusion into per-
sonal affairs.261 It determined that the state of Texas’ belief that life begins at
conception, inarguably an important determination, did not entitle it to
invade the autonomy of pregnant individuals, given medical, philosophical,
and theological disagreement on the subject.262 The fact that the Constitu-
tion and statutory law did not recognize fetuses as possessing personhood
entitling them to the same rights and protections as a born person was
enough to prevent the state from placing the importance of that potential
life, throughout pregnancy, above the autonomy of the pregnant person.263
However, the Court rejected the idea that a person has a right to do
whatever they want with their body without limitation.264
While Roe only discussed privacy, subsequent abortion decisions con-
firm that the right to receive an abortion is grounded in bodily autonomy265
and that the state is not only restricted from intruding into those decisions
itself, but may not give absolute decision-making authority to a third party,
including the parents of a minor.266 Beyond confirming that bodily auton-
omy rights apply to minors, as well as adults,267 the Court’s rejections of
parental and spousal consent laws, especially after the Court’s language in
Griswold about the sacredness of marriage and courts’ general unwillingness
261. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155–56 (1973).
262. Roe, 410 at 159–62.
263. Roe, 410 U.S. at 158–59, 161–62.
264. Roe, 410 U.S. at 154.
265. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849 (1992) (internal
citations omitted) (“It is settled now, as it was when the Court heard arguments in
Roe v. Wade, that the Constitution places limits on a State’s right to interfere with a
person’s most basic decisions about family and parenthood . . . as well as bodily
integrity.”).
266. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) (striking
down a law requiring parental consent during the first twelve weeks of pregnancy
and spousal consent to a daughter or wife’s abortion); Carey v. Population Servs.
Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 694 (1997) (striking down a law prohibiting the sale of contra-
ceptives to minors under the age of sixteen). Carey interprets Danforth as prohibiting
“a blanket provision . . . requiring the consent of a parent” for minors seeking abor-
tions. Id. at 693.
267. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74 (“Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being
magically only when one attains the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as well as
adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights.”).
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to grant minors privacy rights against their parents,268 demonstrate that the
individual’s right to make these life-defining decisions for themselves is the
impetus behind these holdings. As the Court stated in Planned Parenthood
v. Casey:
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices
a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dig-
nity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to
define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the uni-
verse, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these mat-
ters could not define the attributes of personhood were they
formed under compulsion of the State.269
Finally, the Court extended the reach of its personal autonomy cases
beyond decisions involving whether to have a child and into self-definition
of one’s sexuality in Lawrence v. Texas, when it considered a Texas law
prohibiting sodomy between consenting adults of the same sex. While the
law at issue restricted only certain types of sexual intercourse, the Court
explicitly rejected the suggestion that the issue before the Court was only
about sex.270 It defined the scope of the right as the ability of queer people
in same-sex relationships to have the autonomy to make the kind of “inti-
mate and personal choices” that heterosexual people may make.271 In other
words, the Lawrence Court framed the issue as the right of individuals to
identify in a way that is true to who they are without loss of their bodily
autonomy. The Court additionally considered the effect of stigma as part of
its Due Process analysis for the first time, as it determined that, although
the statute only made same-sex sodomy a class C misdemeanor, it deprived
the people affected of their dignity and gave others permission to discrimi-
nate against them.272 Part of Lawrence’s essential holding is that “there is a
268. See, e.g., Wyatt v. Fletcher, 718 F.3d 496, 510 (5th Cir. 2013) (holding that a minor
did not have a clearly established privacy right under the Fourteenth Amendment
that prevented faculty at her high school from disclosing her sexual orientation to
her parent).
269. Casey, 505 U.S. at 851.
270. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 559, 567 (2003) (“To say that the issue in Bowers was
simply the right to engage in certain sexual conduct demeans the claim the individ-
ual put forward, just as it would demean a married couple were it to be said marriage
is simply about the right to have sexual intercourse.”).
271. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 851 (1992)).
272. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575 (“When homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law
of the State, that declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual
persons to discrimination both in the public and in the private spheres.”).
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realm of personal liberty which the government may not enter,”273 which
includes the ability of an individual to identify in a way the state legislature
would rather they not without losing protection under the Constitution.
B. Recognizing a Right to Self-Identify
The Court’s case law forbidding legislatures from interfering with the
core identities that individuals may hold—as a spouse, as a parent, as a
queer person—supports a fundamental right of individuals to self-identify
their gender.
1. The (un)Importance of History and Tradition
The Court once determined that fundamental rights tend to be
“deeply rooted in our legal tradition.”274 In the past two decades, the Court
has largely abandoned history and tradition as benchmarks for when to rec-
ognize a constitutional right. In fact, since Lawrence was decided in 2003,
the Court has spent more pages explaining why it is not necessary for a
fundamental right to be deeply rooted in this country’s history and tradi-
tion than it has recognizing rights that are.275
The Lawrence Court stated that “history and tradition are the starting
point but not in all cases the ending point of the substantive due process
inquiry.”276 Obergefell similarly determined that “[h]istory and tradition
guide and discipline this inquiry but do not set its outer bounds.”277 This
trend represents the Court’s recognition that as society progresses, society
begins to see injustices of which it was once ignorant, and that the Consti-
tution has effects that are not cabined to the rights that were believed to be
fundamental when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified. If constitu-
tional protections are to mean anything to those who were excluded from its
writing, the Constitution must be allowed to adapt to changing values and
recognize that an injustice does not stop being an injustice because it is
long-lived. In Obergefell, the Court stated that:
The nature of injustice is that we may not always see it in our
own times. The generations that wrote and ratified the Bill of
273. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 847).
274. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 722 (1997).
275. See generally Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571–79 (discussing how history and tradition are
not the be-all, end-all of fundamental rights analysis, and the past fifty years are
more relevant to the Court’s analysis than all the time before that).
276. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. at 572 (quoting Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S.
833, 857 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
277. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015).
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Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment did not presume to
know the extent of freedom in all of its dimensions, and so they
entrusted to future generations a charter protecting the right of
all persons to enjoy liberty as we learn its meaning. When new
insight reveals discord between the Constitution’s central protec-
tions and a received legal stricture, a claim to liberty must be
addressed.278
Among the members of the Court, there is a recognition that to hold
the Constitution strictly to what the Founders recognized each of its clauses
to mean would continue to leave out those who have always been excluded
from society. Defining the Constitution’s parameters by the problems that
affected its Founders, all land-owning, white men, neglects the violations of
rights experienced solely by members of oppressed communities. Cabining
the Constitution in this way would be out of line with the intentions of the
Founders themselves, who left the specific rights protected by the Constitu-
tion vague and unenumerated.279 The Court recognized this in Lawrence:
Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses of the
Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment known the
components of liberty in its manifold possibilities, they might
have been more specific. They did not presume to have this in-
sight. They knew times can blind us to certain truths and later
generations can see that laws once thought necessary and proper
in fact serve only to oppress. As the Constitution endures, per-
sons in every generation can invoke its principles in their own
search for greater freedom.280
Self-identification falls into the category of rights inhabited by the
right to marry, to care for one’s children, and to have control over one’s
body, that were never systematically denied to men like the Founders and
that they would not have thought to include.
2. International Precedent
In recent Due Process cases, the Court has looked for a definitive shift
amongst courts and the public, both domestically and internationally, to-
278. Obergefell, 135 S.Ct. at 2598.
279. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Associate Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, 2015 Tanner Lecture
on Human Values (Feb. 6, 2015), in UNIV. OF MICH. LAW SCH. SCHOLARSHIP
REPOSITORY, 2015, at 201.
280. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578–79; see also Obergefell, 135 S.Ct. at 2598–99.
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ward support for the right in question, in place of a long practice of recogni-
tion for the right.281 Just as there is movement in some states to recognize
non-binary genders, there is a growing body of international precedent sup-
porting a movement toward recognition of genders beyond the binary.
Australia has recognized the New South Wales Registrar’s ability to
record an individual’s gender as “non-specific.”282 The case was brought
based on the state of New South Wales’ Courts and Crimes Legislation
Amendment Act, which provides that a person who has undergone a sex
affirmation procedure may apply to register their sex.283 The Court deter-
mined that the Act acknowledged that gender may be ambiguous, not every
person is unequivocally male or female,284 and the Act does not require a
person who has undergone gender affirmation surgery and feels that their
gender is still ambiguous to register inaccurately as either male or female.285
Therefore, Australia has recognized that gender exists beyond the binary.
However, in order to register as an unspecified gender, a person must pro-
vide notes from two medical professionals certifying that they have under-
gone gender affirmation surgery, just as they would have to do to change
their gender from one binary gender to the other.286 Australia also allows
intersex people whose gender was recorded as indeterminate at birth to get
an X on their passport, instead of an M or F.287 Germany passed a similar
law allowing parents to intersex children to record their child’s gender as
“undetermined” or “unspecified” in 2013.288
In 2007, in Pant v. Nepal, the Supreme Court of Nepal held that
people of a third gender were entitled to the constitutionally guaranteed
right to equality, that disparate treatment toward third gender people was
discrimination, and that the state should recognize the existence of third
gender people.289 In practice, the third gender category is used to describe
those assigned male at birth who identify as women or have a traditionally
281. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573–74.
282. NSW Registrar of Births, Deaths, and Marriages v Norrie (2014) 250 CLR 490
(Austl.).
283. Courts and Crimes Legislation Amendment Act 2008 (N.S.W.) 32DA (Austl.).
284. NSW Registrar of Births, Deaths, and Marriages v Norrie (2014) 250 CLR 490, 499
(Austl.).
285. NSW Registrar of Births, Deaths, and Marriages v Norrie (2014) 250 CLR 490, 501
(Austl.).
286. Courts and Crimes Legislation Amendment Act 2008 (N.S.W.) 32DB (Austl.).
287. Steve Dow, Neither Man nor Woman, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, June 27, 2010,
http://www.smh.com.au/nsw/neither-man-nor-woman-20100626-zaye.html.
288. Susan Donaldson James, German Law: Parents of Intersex Kids Can Pick ‘Gender Un-
determined’, ABC NEWS, Nov. 2013, http://abcnews.go.com/Health/german-law-
parents-intersex-kids-pick-gender-undetermined/story?id=20752191.
289. Pant v. Nepal, Writ No. 917 of the Year 2064 BS (2007 AD), translated in 2 NAT’L
JUD. ACAD. L.J., 2008, at 262, 278.
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feminine gender expression and those assigned female at birth who identify
as men or have a traditionally masculine gender expression.290 In its deter-
mination, the Court notes that the Interim Constitution only uses the
terms, man and woman, once, in the provision requiring equal remunera-
tion. Otherwise, it simply uses citizen or sex.291 The Court came to this
conclusion based largely on cases that recognize transgender individuals in
other countries. The most notable thing about Pant is the Court’s direction
that legal acknowledgment of a person as third gender should depend on
“the concerned person’s self-feeling.”292 Here, the Court recognizes a per-
son’s ability to determine their own gender and does not police gender on
the basis of anatomy, presentation, or any other criteria.
Pakistan and India also recognize a third gender that is not dependent
on any kind of alteration of one’s body. In 2009, the Supreme Court of
Pakistan mandated that the term “unix” (eunuch) be recorded under gender
when applicable; that unix be allowed to vote, obtain an education, and
enjoy all rights guaranteed under the Constitution; and that the state had a
duty to ensure that unix receive their share, if any, of family inheritance.293
In 2014, the Supreme Court of India held that failure to recognize a third
gender violated the Constitutional guarantee of Equal Protection of the law,
fundamental rights, protection of life and personal liberty, and prohibition
on sex discrimination.294 Bangladesh also recognizes a third gender, al-
though this was achieved through a cabinet directive.295
Perhaps most on point is the Constitutional Court of Colombia’s The
Decision of Y. Y. in 1995.296 The Constitutional Court of Colombia recog-
nized a right to determine one’s own identity and described this identity
right as a component of human dignity.297 The decision prohibited gender
assignment surgeries from taking place without the consent of the person
being operated on, regardless of the age of that person.298 Four years later,
290. Michael Bochenek & Kyle Knight, Establishing a Third Gender Category in Nepal:
Process and Prognosis, 26 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 11, 13 (2012).
291. Pant, Writ No. 917 of the Year 2064 BS (2007 AD) at 278.
292. Pant, Writ No. 917 of the Year 2064 BS (2007 AD) at 281.
293. Khaki v. Rawalpindi, (2009) Const’l Petition No. 43 (SC) (Pak.).
294. Nat’l Legal Serv. Auth. v. Union of India, (2014) 5 SCC 438 ¶¶ 55–69 (India).
295. Farzana Hussain, Ensure Rights of the Third Gender, DHAKA TRIBUNE, Jan. 8, 2015,
http://archive.dhakatribune.com/juris/2015/jan/08/ensure-rights-third-gender (“Af-
ter a year of the government announcement, we are still waiting for a specific law to
be enacted to cover third gender people’s rights.”).
296. Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], octubre 23, 1995, Sentencia T-
477/95, Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional [G.C.C.] (Colom.).
297. Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], octubre 23, 1995, Sentencia T-
477/95, Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional [G.C.C.] (Colom.).
298. Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], octubre 23, 1995, Sentencia T-
477/95, Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional [G.C.C.] (Colom.).
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the Court reaffirmed that parents often assume gender disambiguation is in
the best interests of their child because of their own fears, but that in reality,
the procedure is highly invasive and irrelevant to the child’s health. In these
situations, the child’s own right to autonomy outweighs the parents’ right to
make decisions for their children.299 These cases recognize the right of an
individual to form their own identity, including their own concept of their
gender, and place a higher value on that right than the preferences or
prejudices of parents and doctors.300 This decision did not come with any
explicit right to identify as a gender outside the binary, but the identity
right it outlines could be used to support one. A similar case was rejected by
the Fourth Circuit in 2015, on the grounds that the sex assignment surgery
performed on the petitioner as a child, which made him infertile and re-
sulted in his assignment to the wrong gender, did not violate his clearly
established rights to procreation and privacy.301
3. The Natural Next Step for Personal Autonomy
The U.S. Supreme Court’s identity cases demonstrate that a state may
not attempt to “control [a person’s] destiny” by stepping into critical iden-
tity shaping decisions.302 Few identities affect the lens through which an
individual views the world as strongly as gender. However, under current
law, an individual is only protected from sex discrimination if they identify
as one of the two state-approved genders. Even then, in many situations
they must identify as the gender they were assigned by a third party at birth
when they were too young to consent to such an assignment. This effec-
tively deprives individuals of any choice in this crucial identification.
The current state of the law requires individuals to go through a
lengthy process that sometimes requires transgender individuals to have ex-
pensive surgeries they may not want in order to change their legal gender.
Often the ability to change one’s gender is also conditioned on a medical
practitioner’s support. This stands in contrast to Planned Parenthood v.
Danforth, where the Court held that a legislature could not give a third
party veto power over another individual’s exercise of a right when the state
299. Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], mayo 12, 1999, Sentencia SU-
337/99, Gaceta de la Corte Constucional [G.C.C.] (Colom.).
300. See Ryan L. White, Preferred Private Parts: Importing Intersex Autonomy for M.C. v.
Aaronson, 37 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 777, 801 (2014).
301. M.C. ex rel. Crawford v. Amrhein, 598 Fed. Appx. 143, 148 (4th Cir. 2015).
302. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003); see Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct.
2584, 2599 (2015) (“Choices about marriage shape an individual’s destiny.”); see also
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992) (“The destiny of
the woman must be shaped to a large extent on her own conception of her spiritual
imperatives and her place in society.”).
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itself lacks the ability to deny that right.303 The Court reasoned that when
two spouses disagree over whether a pregnancy will be terminated, only one
spouse can prevail.304 Because the pregnant spouse is more immediately af-
fected by the pregnancy, that spouse’s wishes must prevail.305
The same is true of the ability to determine one’s gender. It cannot be
said that a doctor is more immediately affected by their patient’s gender
than the patient themselves. A doctor may determine an infant’s gender
based on arbitrary medical standards for anatomy,306 or in the case of am-
biguous genitalia, based on which gender the parents would rather raise the
child to be. These determinations are made without the patient’s consent
and have legal and social ramifications that affect them throughout their
lives. This continues to be the common practice despite the emerging un-
derstanding that gender is subjective and that looking at a person’s anatomy
is not the best way to discover their gender. A doctor may withhold support
for a patient’s legal gender transition for any number of reasons, including
that the doctor does not believe the patient’s gender is real. In the case of
minors, who may not have control over which medical practitioners they
see, these requirements could force them to live as a gender with which they
do not identify simply because their parents do not support the minor’s
right to live as their true gender.
Moreover, the current law conflicts with the freedom of identity
promised in Casey, Lawrence, and Obergefell. The Casey Court states that
“choices central to personal dignity and autonomy” are at the heart of lib-
erty protected under the Fourteenth Amendment.307 Lawrence adds that
when a state may proscribe conduct that defines a person’s identity, it de-
means that person’s life.308 Current law allows state legislatures and courts
to decide that they understand an individual’s gender better than the indi-
vidual themselves. Allowing legislative determination and court adjudication
of a concept as personal and unique to each individual as gender and em-
powering courts to determine that a person’s own experience of their gender
303. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 70 (1976) (“Notwith-
standing these factors, we cannot hold that the State has the constitutional authority
to give the spouse unilaterally the ability to prohibit the wife from terminating her
pregnancy, when the State itself lacks that right.”).
304. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 71.
305. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 71.
306. See SHARON E. PREVES, INTERSEX AND IDENTITY: THE CONTESTED SELF 139
(2003) (describing how the Intersex Society of North America used a plastic ruler, a
“phall-o-meter,” to draw attention to how infants were labeled female or male based
on the size of their phallus).
307. Casey, 505 U.S. at 851.
308. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574 (“[Bowers v. Hardwick’]s continuance as precedent
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is wrong or legally insufficient denies transgender people the autonomy to
“define and express their identity,” a right explicitly guaranteed under
Obergefell.309
The place of non-binary people in current law is even more compli-
cated. In most jurisdictions, non-binary people do not legally exist. This
forces non-binary people to falsely identify as one of the two state-approved
genders in order to receive legal protections. This coercion flies in the face
of Lawrence’s underlying premise that a state cannot condition protection
under the law on an individual’s conformity with how the state believes
people should identify.310 Casey condemns state compulsion surrounding
beliefs belying the core attributes of personhood.311 The governmental de-
nial of dignity in transgender people’s identities reflects the history of
stigma against same-sex relationships outlined in Obergefell.312 In both cases,
the insistence of people who knew their identity was distinct and worthy of
recognition were ignored in favor of others’ perceptions about them.
Moreover, state attempts to define gender and to force everyone into
two predetermined categories, regardless of whether either of those catego-
ries ring true to their lived experience, reflects the type of legislation the
Court rejected in Meyer, Pierce, Stanley, and Moore. All of these cases in-
volved state attempts to use legislation to govern the experiences of the
state’s residents into what the state believed appropriate. The Pierce and
Moore Courts described this as the state’s desire to “standardize” its peo-
ple.313 When the Court rejected the legislature’s definition of a parent in
Stanley and a family in Moore as an attempt by the legislature to substitute
its own point of view for the equally valid experiences of the plaintiffs,314
309. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 2593 (2015).
310. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216
(1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)) (“[T]he fact that the governing majority in a State
has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not sufficient reason for
upholding a law preventing the practice. . . .”).
311. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 851 (“Beliefs about these matters could not define the attrib-
utes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State.”).
312. See Obergefell, 135 S.Ct. at 2596 (“[M]any persons did not deem homosexuals to
have dignity in their own distinct identity. A truthful declaration by same-sex
couples of what was in their hearts had to remain unspoken.”).
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314. Moore, 431 U.S. at 504–05 (“Our [most cherished moral and cultural values] are by
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equally deserving of constitutional recognition.”); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645,
651–652 (1972) (“Nor has the law refused to recognize those family relationships
unlegitimized by a marriage ceremony. The Court has declared unconstitutional a
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the Court demonstrated its valuation of experience over authority when
evaluating laws pertaining to such central concepts.
The right to define one’s own identity is meaningless if it does not
include the right to define a part of a person’s identity as personal and
central to how that person experiences the world as their gender. The cur-
rent legal landscape concerning transgender individuals’ ability to have their
gender recognized under the law is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s
case law on matters at the core of self-identification.
V. CONCLUSION
A holding that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
entitles individuals to define their own identity would give non-binary
plaintiffs the tools they need to successfully challenge sex-based discrimina-
tion under Title VII and the anti-discrimination laws modeled after it.
While there are available arguments under the Equal Protection Clause and
existing statutory law, an Equal Protection holding would not necessarily
give a non-binary plaintiff’s self-identification of their gender legal weight,
and courts in some circuits have steadfastly maintained their cabining of
statutory law to reach only discrimination against cisgender men and
women. A fundamental right to self-identification is the natural next step in
the Supreme Court’s Due Process jurisprudence and would prevent courts
from adjudicating a plaintiff’s gender beyond whether the plaintiff’s beliefs
about their gender are sincerely held. A sincerely held belief standard would
operate, like it does in the First Amendment context, to prevent courts from
refusing protection to people who identify with genders or subscribe to
methods of gender expression unfamiliar to the court. The sincerely held
belief standard is appropriate because gender, like religion, is a concept that
is personal and unique to each individual and is deeply tied to an individ-
ual’s identity. This framework would give non-binary plaintiffs access to
legal protection, regardless of how obscure or poorly understood their gen-
der might currently be. Non-binary plaintiffs would no longer have to wait
until social consciousness catches up for legal protection.
state statute denying natural, but illegitimate, children a wrongful-death action for
the death of their mother, emphasizing that such children cannot be denied the right
of other children because familial bonds in such cases were often as warm, enduring,
and important as those arising within a more formally organized family unit.”).
